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OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERVENTION
Frederic S. Pearson

A Perc~ptual Framcwor~ for Analysis of
Internationr1l Military Intervention
INTRODUCTION
Princes have always interfered clandestinely and overtly in the
politics of each other's domains, and their interference has included
use of military force.

Patterns in the use of force-have varied at

different historical periods.

At some points, force was used most

often to conquer foreign territory, at other points most often to reunify populations (an action which may also involve territorial conquest) or to coerce or prevent specific changes of policy in other
countries (On types and frequency of wars, see Luard,1968; and Wright,
1965); these varieties are not necessarily mutually exclusive, of
course.
Foreign military intervention is a forni of international inter-

ference, and can be hostile or friendly to the target country's government. Military intervention is a broader concept than war,
11
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since it

may include troop movements to reinstate foreign governments overthrown
in coups, to evacuate foreign citizens from a target country, to pur....

sue refugees fleeing to foreign states, to eliminate terrorists operating from foreign territory, etc. Therefore, military intervention
becomes an extremely important concept for the analysis of post-World
War II international violence, since "conventional II forms of warfare
have been increasingly augmented by a -:Wide variety of traditional as
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well as innovative coercive techniques undertaken by national military
units, including reprisal raids,

11

national liberation wars, 11 11 counter-

insurgency warfare," border skirmishes,

11

peace-keeping police actions,"

etc.
If the.undesirable effects (especially on lives and living conditions) of such violence are to be eliminated, researchers must:

(l)

determine the roots of foreign military intervention, i.e., the variables which influence such intervention, and especially those variables
which might be manipulated to control interventions' occurrence; and
(2) determine interventions' consequences for citizens of intervening
and intervened-in states, or bystanding countries, as well as for world
or regional systems. This study is an initial approach to the first of
these tasks.
There is increasing interest in a "scientific 11 approach to the
study of military intervention. (See Rosenau, 1969)

In this connec-

tion, a number of works have appeared specifying hypotheses about.the
occurrence or non-occurrence of foreign military intervention.

(See

Sullivan, 1969; Rosenau, 1968; Rosenau, 1971; Tillema, 1973; Young,
1968; Zartman, 1968; Paul, 1971; Mitchell, 1970.) This developing
field of inquiry has produced many hypotheses and propositions about
intervention, but as yet no one has connected the multitude of hypotheses to form a larger explanation of various types of interventions in
various circumstances.

Nor has anyone provided a theoretical frame-

~ork whic~ would lfok and reconcile th~idivergent propositions about
1ntervent1on generated so far in the 11 erature.

Such a framework

would not be an explanation of interven ion, but rather would constitute
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a way of looking at interventions and identifying the variables that
could be related to form an explanation.
This study is based on a perception of cost-benefit framework
which allows many of the current intervention propositions to be cor

"

ordinated and expanded. Certain propositions apply to intervention
in general; others apply best to various categories of intervention;
and others fit certain stages of the intervention decision-making
process.

The perception-of-cost-benefit framework allows researchers

to specify the. particular facet of interventions to which a given
proposition applies.

Other frameworks conceivably could offer the

same advantages, but the perception-of-cost-benefit framework is broad
enough to encompass divergent approaches to intervention explanation
(ranging from individual decision-maker to world system levels of
analysis).
Until now, it has been very difficult to develop general explanations of military intervention because the concept, as used in the
literature, has been vague.

Few researchers have noted instances of

intervention not included in their definitions, and few have bothered
to tailor their hypotheses to particular types of intervention; the
intervention concept, by nature, is very broad, covering a wide variety
of force utilization, and the concept must be broken down into specific
types of intervention, neither so general as to be meaningless nor so
particular as to be ;heoretically ~ninteresting.
The perception-of-cost-benefit framework should facilitate explanation and control of interventions because, it shows that certain hypotheses relating certain variables will affect certain perceptions of
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intervention cost or benefit.

Even a small change of decision-makers'

calculations of such and benefits could prevent or modify interventions in certain circumstances.

This study is designed to afford a

b~tter idea of which variables relate to specific types of interventions and perceptions about interventions.

It is assumed, of course,

that decision-makers operate on the "reality" they perceive, rather
than on some objective set of "facts."

It is also assumed that one

of the shortcomings of previous intervention study has been a failure
to clarify the intervention concept by specifying types of intervention, and to realize that intervention is not necessarily one phenom·enon.
The essence of the foreign military intervention notion is that
troops of one country undertake military action inside another {target)
country; ar1y such action affects the ·sovereignty of the target country.

After a review of such military actions since 1948 {listed in

the Appendix and derived from the New York Times, regional chronologies
such as the Middle East Journal and African Research Bulletin, previous
conflict studies such as Bloomfield and Beattie's in 1971, and from
scholarly histories of certain conflicts}, foreign military interven-

.

tion has been redefined in this study to include cases overlooked in
previous intervention analyses and to specify particular types of
intervention, each of which seems to stem from particular sets of circumstances or to entail particular sets of consequences. As the per- '
ception-of-cost-benefit framework is applied to each type of intervention, many of the variables which might help predict or control and
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many of the variables affected by that particular type of intervention
will be specified.

Some of these predictive, controlling, or con-

sequential variables seem to be different for different types of intervention.

Some of the variables have been identified previously

by scholars theorizing about intervention; in this study they are
fitted for the first time to particular types of intervention.

In

addition, many other variables, not often mentioned in the literature,
were identified in a review of the intervention cases listed in the
Appendix.
Briefly, foreign military intervention is defined as the movement of troops or military forces by one independent country (or a
group of countries in concert) across the border of another independent country (or colony of an independent country), or action by
troops already stationed in the target country.

Direct military in-

terventions are troop movements or force projections (bombing, shelling,
etc.) entailing combat or military maneuvers with implications for
the target state's authority structure (support or oppose government
or rebel groups), domestic or foreign policies, or domestic conditions
(including what may be attempts to eliminate conditions in the tar,,..

get which offend or harm the intervener).

Thus, direct military in-

tervention means direct military actions affecting policies or conditions through the use {or open demonstration) of force.

Indirect

intervention, on the other hand, affects target's policies or conditions less overtly; stationing troops on bases inside the target
or providing military advisers or training missions to the target are
examples of indirect intervention.

In this study the perception-of-

cost-benefit framework is applied to direct foreign military
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interventions, since their effects and the variables associated with
their occurrence may be more readily detectable than those of indirect
intervention.
Direct interventions may be categorized as hostile (opposing the
target government or s.upporting rebel groups) 1 friendly (supporting
the target government or opposing rebel groups), or neutral (favoring
no facti-0n--an extremely rare circumstance).
Direct hostile, friendly, or neutral military intervention may
be. further classified according to the political circumstances of
the intervention:

(1) interventions in domestic disputes in target

states (disputes in which a faction threatens to overturn the government in an irregular power change); (2) interventions in the absence
of or apart from domestic disputes in the target, with implications
for target's foreign or domestic policies or for conditions in the
target state; and (3) .evacuations of foreign citizens from the target
(divisible into evacuations which are or are not combined with interventions affecting domestic disputes or policies and conditions).
At least six general issues may be of concern tointervening
governments (as evidenced by the behavior of their troops once inside
the target and by historically valid accounts of interests involved):
(1) territorial acquisition or domain; (2) protection of social groups
in the target (including irredentist claim~); (3) protection of economic interests in the target (business enterprises or natural resources);· (4) protection of diplomatic or military interests in the
target (such as military bases, embassies, or diplomats); (5) ideology
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(organized belief systems and doctrines); and (6) regional power balances.

Regarding ideology and reaional power balances, the intervener's

concern might not be with policies or conditions within the target so
much as with the way the target fits into broader international priorities.

Although the categories (hostile-friendly-neutral) and sub-

categories (domestic disputes--policies and conditions) are respectively mutually exclusive (evacuations may or may not overlap the
other two subcategories depending on whether only evacuations with no
further political consequences are studied), several of the six issues
may be involved in any given intervention.

THE PERCEPTION OF COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK
Ex-planation, in part. consists of identifying the variables most
closely associated with and which tend to bring about the phenomenon
to be explained (the dependent variable).

The perception-of-cost-

benefit framework is designed to help in explaining interventions by
showing how specific variables fit into the intervention decisionmaking process.

Hopefully, some of these variables will prove manip-

ulable (Meehan, 1968), and hopefully the likely effect of changes in
certain independent variables on the dependent variable can be determined.
Certain basic assumptions about military intervention in general
must be specified before identifying variables which may affect specific types of intervention.

These assumptions basically constitute ·the

perception-of-cost-benefit framework.

It may be assumed that military

intervention decisions are based on six sets of perceptions:

8

(1) perceptions of the degree of threat to major values or of the
opportunity for promotion of major values entailed in the situation
preceding the intervention decision; (2) perceptions of plausible alternatives to intervention to deal with the threat or opportunity;
· (3) perceptions of the costs of interventions vs. the costs of the alternatives; (4) perceptions of the costs of not intervening; (5) potential intervener's perceived cost tolerance (See Rosen, 1970:215-37);
and (6) perception of the probable "success" of intervention in attaining desired objectives.

These perceptions may be held by various ac-

tors in any given scenario:

decision-makers or influential elites in

the potential intervener; decision-makers or influential elites--including opposition groups--in the potential target; decision-makers or
elites in other countries. The most crucial perceptions for any given
intervention are probably those of intervener and target governmental
leaders, and of opposition groups in the target (if there is a "domestic dispute" in the target).
Bureaucratic influences on decision-making should not be ignored
in a perception-of-cost-benefit framework for intervention.

Decisions

are seldom made by one man at one time, and individuals, especially in
bureaucratic settings, have diverse incentives for their decisibnal in~
puts (to further their own careers, their own agencies, etc.)
Allison, 1971; and Halperin and Kanter, 1973).

{See

Some of these incentives

can be seen as costs of intervening or not intervening, however.

Cost

calculations need not concern only the international stra·tegic setting.
The perception-of-cost-benefit framework does not necessarily
imply that decisions will be rational.

Costs may be weighed against
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benefits in merely the roughest form of calculations; information may
be missing or distorted; perceptions may be distorted or selectively
recalled.

It is assumed, however, that decision-makers will consider

the implications of possible interventions on the basis of what they
consider to be the relative costs and benefits.
Britain's failure to intervene militarily in Rhodesia, after the
unilateral declaration of independence, may be understood as a cost
calculation.

Most people seem to concentrate on the cost of interven-

tion in this case.:.-the geographic distance from Britain, likely Rhodesian resistance, capabilities of Rhodesia's anny, memories of costs at
Suez in 1956, etc. The other side of the cost calculation, cost of
non-intervention, should also be examined. There is some doubt that
Britain's major interests were threatened in the Rhodesian case. Costs
of non-intervention--possible public opinion backlash, possible African
regional "instability," possible economic losses, displeasure of black
African states, etc.--probably did not seem great.

Before concluding

that Britain is unlikely to intervene in future conflict situations,
the various costs and major values in a given situation must be analyzed.
Cost tolerance is also a major factor in intervention decisionmaking.

This is a combination of willingness and ability to pay the

perceived cost of intervention once such a cost has been calculated.
~or potential interveners, cost tolerance probably depends on certain
domestic conditions as well as on level of perceived threat and perceived probability of success.

Cost tolerance for parties seeking out-

side intervention may depend on the severity of the domestic dispute
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in which they are engaged, as well as on their own perceived probability
of success without help.

For both interveners and those seeking inter-

vention, ability to pay helps condition willingness to pay--though other
factors condition motivation as well (e.g., war-weariness, level of
threats to major values, etc.).
ability to pay.

Motivation also conditions perceived

While observers have argued that Britain's cost tol-

erance for foreign interventionary adventures has decreased with its
increasing monetary and production problems since the l950's, John
Burton argues that Britain has hever been wealthier than since World
War II, and that its interventionary restraint must be due to factors
other than capability, factors such as welfare demands and British
acceptance of foreign self-determination.

(Burton, 19~8:196-97).

Of

course, Burton might have added U.S. influence as a potential restraint
on British interventions, but nevertheless it is clear that willingness,
and even perceptions of ability to pay, may be based on political decision about what is important to pay for--indeed on the establishment
of major values in the first place.
Another important calculation is overlooked by almost all intervention theorists:

perception of plausible alternatives.

Any decision

to move troops to another country is complicated; costs are not singular--there are many types of costs for intervention or non-intervention.
Military intervention may be viewed as a "last resort" technique by
leaders of some countries, especially countries large and resourceful
enough tO' attain goals by other means.

Some leaders, however, depending

on their country's resources, their own goals, and the nature of the
perceived threat to or opportunities to further major values, may view
interventjon as the only available alternative--or even as the preferred
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alternative (for instance, if justifying expenditures on anned forces
is a desired objective, a leader may resort to force against a weak
target even before seriously considering negotiations).
Hypotheses current in the literature on intervention and in the
media pay insufficient attention to plausible alternatives to troop
movement. Scholars and reporters have hypothesized that certain changes
within states or within the international system make intervention more
or less probable in different time periods. The New York Times has reported, "Because of the change in internal political situation [of the
U.S.] and the international climate, the United States virtually rules
out any repetition of the forceful support for pro-Western-governments
in the Middle East that was undertaken by the Eisenhower Administration
. . . in 1958. 11 (New York Times, September 17, 1970, p. 19).

Some might

conclude that a U.S. military move to Jordan in 1970 was precluded by
U.S. domestic disruption, by international criticism of military intervention, or by decreased Soviet strength.

However, looking closely at

the events, we see that other means were available, and that in the
area of major values, the entire Middle Eastern region did not seem imperiled in 1970 as it had in 1958 after the fall of the Iraqi monarchy.
Reportedly, Israel was prepared to intervene in Jordan if Syria had
crossed the Jordanian border in strength. There were even rumors that
the U.S. would cooperate in this venture by protecting Israel 1 s shores
during the operation.
State Department officials interviewed recently by the author
stressed the importance of alternative; for intervention decisions;
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some felt that Vietnam and similar experi.ences made new U.S. interventions unlikely, while others felt that each situation is so unique
and intervention decisions are so complex that no predictions about
the future (including those that rule out intervention) are possible
unless context is fully specified.

Negotiations were often cited as

a plausible alternative to intervention. Action through the C.I.A.
and/or I.T.T. appear to have been alternatives to military intervention against the Allende government in Chile, 1970--though the New
York Times attributed restraint to the fact that, IIMany officials
believe that any United States interference could lead to a civil war
in Chile and a surge of anti-United States feelings in Latin America
as well as to domestic protest comparable to the demonstra·tions that
followed last spring's incursion into Cambodia."

(New York Times,

September 21, 1970, p. 2.) For the U.S., forceful intervention may
have been quite conceivable in 1970; the existence -of a reliable
proxy state or of economic levers may hav& constituted alternatives
to direct intervention.
The sixth factor affecting intervention decisions--the probable
success (or failure) of intervention--relates to the gains the intervener can foresee.

Conceivably, major values could be threatened,

perceived cost of intervention could be reasonable, perceived costs
of not intervening high, alternatives few, and yet intervention might
not occur because expected gains might be low--military intervention
may not seem an appropriate means toward desired ends.

This is per-

haps the most subtle of the six factors, and perhaps the one decisionmakers most often ignore.

It involves preparation of clearly stated
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objectives.

As argued below, inter-relations of the six factors in

the perception-of-cost-benefit framework make it unlikely that if five
factors pointed toward the need for intervention, the sixth would seem
discouraging to the decision-maker.

In addition, time constraints,

especially under conditions of high perceived threat, may preclude much
thought about appropriateness and likely success of a military response.
If interveners desire to take foreign territory or punish adversaries,
or if they perceive few alternatives to intervention, little thought
may be give!n to long range impacts and consequences.

In some instances,

military or civilian advisers may provide decision-makers with favorable
and optimistic evaluations of success probability when actual success
probability is low. This may be due to conflicting objectives, interagency rivalry, bureaucratic conformity, failure to reevaluate decisions
or policies, desire to curry favor or obtain more of the budget, or blind
faith in militarily coerced solutions or in others' advice .

. HYPOTHESES AND PERCEPTIONS OF COST AND BENEFIT
There may be inter-relationships among the six major factors,
and hypotheses from decision-making and intervention studies may be
fitted together to discover some of these (Figure 1).

Bear in mind

that few, if any, of the hypotheses or links in Figure 1 have been
empirically verified for intervention data.

All relationships spe-

cified are meant to be suggestive for further empirical study.

{FIGURE 1. ABOUT HERE)
Decision-making and crisis studies have noted that increased
threat perception shortens perceived decision time, and therefore,
tends to lessen the number of alternatives considered (although some

FIGURE 1
PERCEPTIONS AFFECTING INTERVENTION DECISIONS
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argue, as well, that the greater the costs and risks or uncertainty
in a decision and thimore signifi~ant the changes in method and goals
involved, the more intense is the search for information.)

..

1969:129,158 and 161; and Burton, 1968:76-77).

(See Hermann,

In a sense, states are

always in crises, and all decisions are made under pressure.

Thus,

Figure 1 shows the hypothesized link between level of perceived threat
or opportunity to promote major values and perceived plausible alternatives to intervention (correlations or relationships especially subject to controversy are indicated by dotted lines).

In general, also.

the greate!r the perceived threat to or opportunity to promote major
values, the greater the perceived cost {political, military, social,
or economic) of not intervening.
There is also a hypothesized positi.ve relationship between level
of perceived threat or opportunity and·cost tolerance for intervention.
This tends to work through

willingness {motivation) to pay.

The more

important va-lues are, and the more they seem threatened, the more· people
will be willing to sacrifice to protect them.

(Paige, 1968_:300). In

the pattern in Figure 1, it is hypothesized that increased threat per. cepti on operates through increased perceived cost of not intervening
to increase willingness to pay, as well as several other variables.
It also seems likely that the higher the perceived value of inter.venti on (threat or opportunity) and perceived probability of successful
intervention, the greater the wi 11 i ngness to pay the costs of i nterventi on.

People seem likely to refuse to pay even a low price for some-

thing they have very little expectation of receiving (raffle tickets
notwithstanding). Costs may also be evaluated in terms of the prospective
gains, and if gains are expected to be great, costs may seem small.
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Two more hypotheses are drawn from 11 cognitive dissonance 11 theory,
which posits that individuals are likely to distort incoming information to fit their pre-existing beliefs and expectations.

First, threat-

ening conditions or perceived opportunities may affect people's estimation of what remedies cost.

People feeling threatened or perceiving

great gain in intervention may refuse to believe intervention costs as
much as they are told it costs.

Hence, a negative causal link between

perceived threat or opportunity and perceived cost of intervention is
posited in Figure 1, along with an indirect link through perceived cost
of not intervening.

A negative two-way causal link is also posited be-

tween perceived probability of success and perceived costs--an interaction effect in which higher expected cost of intervening leads people
to lower estimation of success (while higher expected cost of not intervening leads them to raise estimated success probability), which in
turn leads them to higher estimation of intervention cost (and lower
estimation of non-intervention cost).

Furthermore, a higher level of

perceived threat and resultant need for success entailed in perceived
cost of not intervening may lead, because people tend to cling to and
expand any hope, to increased estimation of success probability.
Many other relationships among the six perceptual factors may be
reciprocal.

For instance, cognitive dissonance may work two ways, so

that greater perceived cost of not intervening leads to lower estimates
of intervention costs, while low estimates of such costs may also lead
to greater perc'e; ved cost of not intervening (e.g., expected adverse
public opinion at home if government fails to act at low cost and
situation in target worsens).

The reciprocal relationship between
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perceived cost of not intervening and perceived success probability,
as well as between willingness to pay and perceived success probability,
reflect what may be a tendency for wishful thinking in decision-making.
Furthermore, decision-makers who are already willing to pay the price
of intervention may be likely to perceive (or point to) great cost in
not intervening and may perceive (or point to) few alternatives. Perceiving few alternatives probably also leads to greater willingness to
pay.
This is obviously a tangled web of mutual causation, although many
of the hypothesized links'could drop out with empirical testing. Some
direct links may drop out or some indirect links may be replaced by
direct links.

Furthermore, some links probably do not exist; for in-

stance, number of perceived plausible alternatives seems unlikely to
lead to changes in perceived ability to pay, though conceivably a link
may exist (empirical testing could show this).

Working the other way,

however, those states most able to pay for intervention may also be
those perceiving the most non-military alternatives (with more economic
resources, they may be able to economically penetrate or influence
foreign countries).

In some circumstances, however, leaders who per-

ceive their own inability to pay may seek more alternatives.

Thus,

hypothesized positive and negative correlations between ability and
alternatives should both be tested.
The complex interconnections are typical of human perceptions.
Obviously, though, perceptions are not simply
11

11

influenced by other

perceptions; environmental conditions impinge as well.

These make a

complex causal problem even more complex, and yet at the same time
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often include manipulable variables which could change perceptions.
Many of these environmental variables relate differently to different
categories of intervention (defined above).

In discussing these com-

plex influences~ the value of breaking intervention into more specific
units of analysis can be seen, and thP strengths and weaknesses of the
particular categorization presented here can be determined.

Figures

2-7 illustrate factors, mentioned in the intervention literature or
derived from a review of cases in the Appendix, which may affect each
of the six major perceptions (the links shown in Figure l are not included in these figures, and the readers should remember to add them
for fuller explanation of any of the six perceptions; if a variable
directly affects one of the six perceptions, and that perception in
turn affects another of the six, then the variable indirectly affects
the other perception).

VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH LEVEL OF PERCEIVED THREAT OR
OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE MAJOR VALUES
Threat or opportunities perceived by those calling for outside
powers to intervene on their behalf may be distinguished (Figure 2)
from threat or opportunity perceived by prospective interveners, both
large powers (on the basis of GNP, super powers--US and USSR--great
powers--UK, France, China, Japan, West Germany).and medium or small
powers.

It seems that the caller's perceptions are most intimately

linked to the severity of the domestic dispute in which it is engaged.
Severity of dispute in turn is made up of at least five specific (and
probably intercorrelated) variables:

(1) scope of dispute (whether it

covers just a part of the country or most of the country); (2) duration
of the dispute; (3) ideological content of dispute (whether or not it is a
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conflict of formal ideologies); (4) structural vs. non-structural
nature of the dispute (whether the dispute concerns the structure
of the government in the country--as opposed to 11 authori ty 11 or 11 personnel II disputes over arrangement of roles and those who fill those_
roles in the country--See Rosenau, 1964); and (5) level of violence
(perhaps measured by number of people killed or wounded in combat or
terror-related incidents).
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Notice that some of the variables constituting severity of domestic
dispute also may affect potential intervener's perception of threat or
opportunity and willingness to pay in such disputes.

Rosenau maintains

that, "Structural war . . . has a high probability of attracting foreign·
intervention. 11

(Rosenau, 1964:63-64)". This is often the result of per-

ceived threa·ts to potential intervener's major values.

Ideological dis-

putes probably work the same way in certain circumstances--for both large
powers (USSR into Hungary) and small powers (Egypt into Yemen).

(Zartman,

1968:188 and Boals, 1970). Of course, such disputes can also be used as
justifications for interventions planned for other reasons, such as trying to impose policies on a target state or to affect regiona_l power
balance.
Scope of dispute (areal) may also affect level threat or opportunity
perceived by potential interveners, especially when geographic distance
between potential intervener (especially small power inter_veners· unable
to project military power very far) and target is small; conflict tends
to spill across borders--refugees escape and are pursued, and germs of
discontent may spread, while territorial issues may be raised. Thus,
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scope of dispute may relate to territorial gain, as well as social protection, regional power balance~, and desire to preempt or remedy threats
(affect policies and condition.-:. in the target).

Geographic proximity and

widespread domestic disputes in target may increase the probability of
al 1 · these types; of intervention, though si,nce scope or severity of disputes may increase perceived costs of intervention as well, especially
for small powers (see below), intervention may not always occur.
Geographic proximity may also increase the probability of intervention to change certain policies even in the absence of a domestic
disp.ute in the target~ the effects of many policy decisions--including
ideological, social, regional, or administrative policies--are likely
to be felt first by immediate neighbors.

On the other hand, economic

i"nterests seem less likely to be influenced by geographic distance,
since most states are unlikely to find resources and markets close to
home.

Interventions for evacuation of foreign nationals or for protec-

tion of embassies and other diplomatic-military interests also seem
likely to be relatively independent of geographic distanc~; large powers
seem most 1ikely to have such interests far from home and are capable
of pursuing them even at great distances.
Most small power interventions seem likely to entail territorial
or social interests close to home, while larger power interventions may
be more concerned with nearby or distant military, strategic, and economic interests.

Suil,ivan points to the probability of major power

economic intervention:

11

In a situation where one nation is economically

dominant over another, the occurrence of disruption in the latter is
likely to raise fears in the dominant nation that its economic position
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will be affected and perhaps ended.

it will resort to intervention

in the hopes of influencing the domestic conflict. 11

(Sullivan, 1969:7).

Large powers do not seem as likely as small powers to undertake territorial or social protective intervention because such issues have
probably beien settled for most great or super powers.

Many small

powers· press territorial or irredentist claims stemming from colonial
times (many other small states are devoted to the territorial status
..ill!Q.

for fear of other states' claims), and the need to press them may

be increased by population ( 11 lateral 11 ) pressure on land and resources
(on lateral pressure, see Choucri and North, 1972); obviously, in
some cases, small power territorial ambitions can include economic
interests, as when Iraq seeks to annex Kuwait.

Because of such

regional territorial grievances, certain small powers may be less
interested--and others as much or more interested--in regional
bility11 and power balan_ces than large powers.

11

sta-

Large or small power

regional interventions may also serve as signals or warnings to nearby states (perhaps warnings to change certain policies) as well as
affect policies or conditions in the target state.

On the other hand,

both sma 11 and 1arge powers may perceive threats in the interests and

..

potential intervention of other states in a particular target. Preemptive or preventive intervention could follow to deter such third
party interventions.
For great powers {Britain, France, China, West Germany, Japan),
distant interventions may be especially conditioned by ex-colonial
ties. Such ties lead to what Mitchell (1970) calls 11 transactional 11
links.

{Mitchell does not apply his categories to the intervention
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proclivities of major as opposed to minor powers.)

These include inter-

national transactions such as educational, economic, military, and poli-tical exchanges, i,n which people or goods move back and forth between
countries.

Obviously transactional linkages also grow between countries

that have never been in a colonial relationship.

Major powers are likely

to have relatively many transactional links as compared to small powers.
Many major powers transactions are with smaller powers, and major powers
would have the military capability to intervene to protect economic or
diplomatic-military interests in small states or to evacuate citizens.
Small powers, on the other hand, are likely to have few transactional links with other small states, and relatively many with powerful· states.

(This is not to say that if transactional ties exist be-

tween small states they wil1 not affect intervention probability or
that small states may not seek to obtain material interests in other
small states, but rather that such ties are unlikely to be very· strong
or frequent among small states.)

Small powers are not likely to be in

a power position to intervene and protect such transactional interests
in strong target states.

Instead, small powers' interventions are prob-

ably conditioned (more than large or medium powers• interventions) by
what Mitchell calls 11 affective 11 links, in addition to territorial and
regional political pi sputes.

Affective links consist of ideological and

religious similarities, family, clan, and tribal links, and ethnic or
racial ties.

African (Somalia-Ethiopia), Asian (Indonesia-Mala~sia),

and even European or Middle Eastern (Gre_ek-Turkey-Cyprus) interventions
have often related to such affective linkages.

"Personal ties" may be

added to the affective list for small powers, since leaders sometimes
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intervene on behalf of old friends {because of differences in levels of
bureaucratization, small power interventions may be influenced more than
large power interventions by personal ties, though even great or super
power interventions may sometimes relate to personal connections; the
NewYork
- Times reported personal ti es between de Gaulle and certa.in
African leaders heAefended).
Ideology should also be separated from other affective variables,
since it characterizes interventions by large as well as small powers.
Rosenau (1969:168) hypothesizes that, "When ideological rivalry is intense, decision-makers are more likely to attach greater import to possible governmental changes abroad than is the case when blueprints of
the future are less salient features of international life . . . Indeed,
when politics is highly ideological, the desirability of governmental
changes abroad may generate interventionary behavior even if the pos. sibility of such changes is extr·emely remote. 11
Thus, it is hypothesized that large powers .are likely to be quite
sensitive to perceived threats to or opportunities to advance ideological
and transactional interests, and are likely to consider interventions
to promote strategic interests in the 11 stability 11 of certain regions.
Such interests are likely to seem threatened by severe ideological and
structural disputes in states where there are many military, ideological,
strategic, and economic large power interests.

Also, if such potential

target states change pol icy quickly, or if "ominous" conditions develop
in the economic, ideological, strategic or military areas,large powers
may perceive threats or opportunities even in the absence of domestic
disputes in the targ~t.
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Small powers may be most sensitive to perceived threats to or opportunities to advance 1.1affective 11 (including social group) interests
in other small countries, as well as territorial or social interests
in nearby states.

Leaders

1

personal interests in other countries, or

perception of threats to regional influence may also lead to small
power interventions.

These interests may. seem threatened by domestic
.

disputes in nearby foreign states or by such states' policy changes or
domestic conditions.

In addition, leaders of both large and small·

powers are likely to perceive threat in physical attacks upon their
territory or citizens by governments of or groups in foreign states,
and hence, may be tempted to retaliate by intervening.

The pattern

of interventions since World War II listed in the Appendix tend to
bear out these predicted patterns.

l

Obviously, threats can become more specific, especially for countries with certain characteristics.

Allied states are likely to per-

ceive considerable threat in news that an alliance member plans to
leave the alliance (Paul, 1971).

Previous intervention may lead large

powers to future interventions, as they build up stakes in the survival
of favored factions in the target and, hence, perceive greater threats

..

or opportunities for influence.

Intervention by·other large powers

may lead a large power to competitively {or cooperatively) intervene,
as major values seem threatened.

However, competitive intervention

also may lead to greater perceived costs {perhaps more extensive
fightfng) for both large and small powers; thus there may be a deterrent effect to counteract the effect of threats or opportunities to
advance major interests.

..
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(FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE)
Two factors are commonly cited by American scholars and statesmen
as affectin9 perceptions of costs of failing to intervene:
for "corrrnitments and credibility," and/or alliances.

consequences

These factors have

been included in Figure 3 as possible roots of intervention, but there
remains serious doubt about their importa nee for US or other states '
· interventions (hence the dotted lines).

The corrmitment factor may be

related to interventions protecting target states from other foreign
governments' attacks (a· form of .intervention affecting target's policies
or conditions).

However, states are free to ignore such "commitments"

when political considerations override, so that the importance of commitments for intervention is questionable.

Arab states had made commit-

I

ments of solidarity and alliance in 1956 and 1967, but these commitments
did not bring Saudi Arabia and other states into the fight against Israel.
Even alliance ties. may not be reliable predictors of interventionary
behavior.

Large powers have intervened frequently inside smaller power

allies (viz., USSR-Czechoslovakia or US-Dominican Republic), but the
question is whether both alliance and intervention stem from the perceived geo-political importance of the target, as well as the power
ratios of intervener a'nd target.
1973 and 1968:65-86).

(On alliance commitments, see Fedder,

If so, alliance itself is not the key to inter-

vention likelihood; the US did not seem ready to intervene in France
when de Gaulle's policies seemed ~o we~ken NATO logistically, if not
politically.

Empirical analysis must detennine whether threats to

alliance cohesion are sufficient to bring on interventions in situations that might not have bred intervention without an alliance.
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In this connection, the author's recent analysis of interventions
(defined as in this study) occuring since World War II (see Appendix
for list and categorizations of interventions) shows that, in general,
alliances may be arenas for intervention.

In 41 percent of interven-

tions, intervener and target were allies; 43 percent of alliance interventions were in domestic disputes.

Only eight percent of alliance

interventions were hostile to the target government.

This seems to

indicate that a considerable percentagP of post-war interventions consisted of governments assisting allies, often in domestic disputes.
On the other hand, in approximately 50 percent of interventions in
domestic disputes (codable for alliance membership), intervener and
target were not military allies, with 44 percent of these being friendly
interventions.

Thus, while most interventions by non-allies in each

other's domestic disputes were hostile, friendly interventions were
not infrequent even in the absence of alliance ties.

Political stra-

tegies rather than formal alliance commitments may be the reason for
friendly interventions.

However, alliance membership may be a good

predictor pf friendly vs. hostile interventions.

It is striking that

most interventions among allies, either in domestic disputes or to
affect target's policies or conditions, have been friendly (support

..

government or oppose rebels), while most interventions--regardless
of category of intervention--among non-allies have been hostile. Interestingly, only two of 28 post-war territorial interventions have
been among allies, while 25 have been among non-allies.
While alliance ties may make friendly intervention seem less
costly or costs of non-intervention seem somewhat greater, potential
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interveners may look most often to their domesticscenes to calculate
costs of non-intervention (or of intervention, as explained below).
Depending,on the success of the endeavor and public or elite awareness
of the issues involved, decisions to move troops run the risk of public
disapproval at home.

But failure to intervene while a favored foreign

state suffers may seem ·likely to increase the dissension in the public,
among elites, or in the armed forces.· Depending on the nature of public,
elite, or armed forces discontent, leaders may read discontent as a sign
that non-intervention will threaten their political future (if discontent
concerns alleged governmental softness in foreign policy) or as a sign
that intervention will threaten their political future (if discontent
concerns governmental "adventurousness" or neglect of domestic concerns).
It is important to examine the state of domestic public opinion when
leaders have decided either to intervene or not intervene.

VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH PERCEIVED COST OF INTERVENTION
As mentioned above, increases in perceived cost of intervention
may lead to searches for alternatives to intervention, and cost of

.

intervention may be weighed against cost of non-intervention. Not all
calls for outside.aid are answered and not all domestic or ideological
disputes attract foreign intervention.

Variables appearing in Figure 4

may affect perceived.costs for various types of intervention.
(FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE)
When interveners oppose target governments, one of the most important of these costs is likely to stem from power imbalances between
intervening and target states.

(Young, 1968:180-81).

Roughly, power

imbalance may be measured through gross national p~oducts or comparative

..
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military capabilit~es.

Generally, the greater the advantage of pro-

spective intervener over target, the less costly intervention (especially hostile intervention) will seem to the intervener.

By the

same token, small powers are unlikely to intervene in more powerful
states.

As the list in the

App,~ndix

~hows, there have been few

hostile sma.11-to- large power interventions since 1945.

They have

occurred mainly in colonial possessions of the large powers.

Further-

more, large powers rarely intervene in states their own size.
Power ratio and geographic distance both are likely to affect
cost perceptions.

Despite technological breakthroughs, there are

still substantial costs in moving men and material great distances.
Major values indeed must be involved to warrant such expenditures; as
argued previously, major values (excluding economics) are most likely
to be threatened or involved close to home.

Thus, few very distant

interventions of any type may be expected, and only major powers seem
able to afford intervention at great distances.

In a study of the re-

lation between geographic proximity and intervention probability, it
was found that leaders of even major powers evidently must feel assured of considerable power advantage over targets before attempting
hostile interventions far from home.

(See author's citation, 1973, in

References).
Furthermore, the perceived cost of intervention may increase or
decrease, depending upon whether prospective interveners are supported
or opposed by statements or actions of other powerful states.

Leaders

of great and small powers may also be reluctant to risk the cost of
intervention in targets close to other major powers.

Spheres of
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influence could preclude interventions either hostile to or friendly
to target governments.

In general, it has been hypothesized that,

"Isolated nations or nations with very limited international contacts . . . are apt to be the targets of interventionary activity .- 11
(Sullivan, 1969:7.) Also, Sullivan's hypothesis that,

11
•••

under-

developed nations become prime targets for intervention because of
the likelihood that civil disruption occurring there will become an
international problem 11 (it might be better to say "international concern") seems well -founded,- especially si nee such states are unlikely
to be in a favorable power ratio to prospective interveners.
Intervention costs may also seem to rise if there is a prospect
for resistance in the target-(as well as from other outside powers}.
Interventions to influence target's policies or conditions are· likely
to be much more difficult if there is active popular or military resistance in the target--though leaders of major powers may feel able
to weather such resistance if other major powers can be kept out.
Severity of disputes in the target can also raise costs, since a
prospective defeat of a favored faction may be offset only with considerable effort.
Notice also that common alliance membership between prospective
intervener and target may reduce intervener's expected costs.

There

seems to be a certain de facto legitimacy to intra-alliance interventions as compared to interventions in non-aligned or hostile states,
at least frqm the Soviet and American viewpoints.

Also, competitive

intervention by a member of an opposing alliance may seem unlikely,
and leaders of a large power -intervening--either pro- or-anti~government
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--in an ally's internal affairs probably do not much fear effective
international organization or major power opposition.

This may in-

crease the "intervention proneness" of small states in alliances
--but

not to competitive intervention.

The discussion of cost is not r11f:r1nt to imply that "deterrence"
always works.

States without clear power advantages have been known

to use military force.
framework.

Cost is just one factor in the decisional

If threat or opportunity is perceived as sufficiently

great, governments might be expected to intervene abroad despite
probability of a difficult fight with poor prospects for success.
Discussion so far has dealt mainly with interveners' cost calculations.

What about costs perceived by parties calling for out-

side aid in domestic disputes? These may also be affected by power
disparities.

Even rebel groups may be reluctant to call upon the

aid of major powers if this will hurt them politically--if there
would be domestic resentment of powerful foreign

11

intruders, 11 or if

they suspect that the major power might attempt to dominate them
later.

This is why popularity at home may be a factor influencing

decisions to call for intervention as well as to intervene (intervener will want to know that public and elite opinion at home supports or at least tolerates the intervention).

Perceived costs are

raised if the outside power--whether large or small--is identified
by the local population as 11 foreign 11 --if affective links are lacking
between intervener and target state.

Also, rebels' perception of

costs of outside intervention may depend on the prospects for a quick
governmental takeover.

If outside aid could assure quick takeover,

there might not be time for public or regional resenunent of "foreign
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intruders. 11

Perceived costs may increase greatly if prospects are for

a prolonged struggle, though the costs of such a struggle without outside support may increase as well.

Finally, interveners may insist on

greater effort or policy reform by factions calling for aid; factions
may have to prepare for the increased financial or political costs in
complyinq with these requests.

VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH COST TOLERANCE FOR INTERVENTION
Costs may be perceived as low and yet there may be no intervention, or costs may be perceived as high but intervention may still
occur.

Leaders• cost tolerance (and in prolonged interventions, that

of mass publics) helps determine whether the price will be paid.

As·

noted, cost tolerance probably depends on level of perceived opportunities or threats, and 1s determined by willingness• and ability to pay.
Other variables may be involved as well (Figure 5), and once again,
variables affecting cost tol era nee for potential i nterveners may differ from those affecting the tolerance of those calling for outside
help.

(FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE)
j

For purties seeking outside aid, the severitX of the displJte 1n
which they are involved, together with their pros~ects for winning
!

unaided (depending on their organization and popularity), and the importance of the dispute to them may be the most i~portant determinants
!

of willingness and perceived ability to pay the pbtential costs of such
aid.

It can be hypothesized that the greater the/severity and salience

of the dispute to the parties, the greater their willingness to pay
i
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political costs in calling for outs1de aid--costs such as popular resentment at foreign intrusion or potential outside domination of the
country (hence the possible negative relationship between power ratio
and factions' cost tolerance).

This is especially true of governmental

decisions to seek outside support; severity of dispute (including threat
to governmental structures even if level of violence is not very great)
-signals governmental weakness, and it often signals rebel strength.
For those contemplating intervention, willingness to pay may be
determined by more complex factors.

Large powers' transactional, ideo-

logical and alliance links to targets may be important, as they probably increase, or at least indicate large powers' willingness to sacrifice to _affect targets I pol icles, conditions, or factions.

Qua l ifica-

tion is necessary here, though, since allies have, in the past, refused
to come to each others aid and ideological stances have been quickly
changed to fit changing political circumstances.

Thus, the effects

of alliance membership and ideological similarities on all categories
of intervention, as well as the impact of intervention decisions on
alliance policy and ideological positions should be further examined
empi ri ca 11 y.
Desire for regional influence also probably increase's- large and
-sma_ll powers• willingness to sacrifice for foreign policy goals,• and
increas~s willingness to intervene for regional power bal_ances. Small
powers' affective links (including ideology} to foreign states would
be likely to increase their leaders• willingness to act militarily in
those states, especially to ,intervene in domestic disputes.

The per-

ceived need to compete for leadership of 11 pan 11 movements (e.g. "panArabu) may spur small states to intervene tp protect "progressive" or
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oppose "reactionary" reg,m~s- ,

well as to affect target s conditions.
1

Egypt's Verner intervention came soon after the breakup of EgyptianSyrian UAR, and Nasser mav hav.~ wanted to prove his militancy in de'
fending Arab socialism and unity in the face of Syrian taunts.

This

intervention seemed to fit both regional power balance and ideological
classifications.
Depending on whether intervention in domestic disputes supports
governments or rebels, the severity of domestic disputes is likely to
influence the zeal of small power potential interveners.

Widespread

and prolonged structural and/or ideological disputes would seem to discourage pro-government, while encouraging anti-government interveners,
as governmental weaknesses are highlighted.

For those backing them,

rebels may seem a good bet in such severe disputes.

Small power po-

tential interveners may be especially attuned to severity of the target's dispute, since they could become embroiled in a war of attrition,
especially if backing a beleagered government.

As mentioned below,

though, perceived alternatives to intervention are probably increased
with increased viability of favored factions in domestic disputes.
Thus, while willingness to intervene to support a viable goverrment
or viable rebels may increase, the perceived necessity to intervene
decreases.

Intervention .in such circumstances may be unlikely.

For intervention in domestic disputes to occur, interveners may
have to ignore the weakness of parties they propose to aid. Usually
interveners will intervene for their own interests rather than for
those of foreign factions.

They may attempt to strengthen factions
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•ilmost as a by-product or necessity of intervention.

Sometimes, as in

certain US or USSR interventions, they will actually invent a faction
where none exists, so as to 11 legitimize 11 intervention (here, investigation is required to detennine whether domestic disputes ante- or postdate the intervention).
'
Lingering grievances
against target governments or factions and

power advantage over them may increase intervener's willingness to pay
for hostile intervention.

Such grievances may stem from previous at-

tacks (physical or political) by the target state, target's territorial
or social policies, or failure of the target to expel terrorists or
refugees offending or attacking the -aggrieved state.

Territorial in-

terventions may also be spurred by 11 lateral pressure" within the intervening state, i.e., by the pressure of population on scarce land
and resources.
Cost tolerance depends on perceived ability to pay in addition to
willingness,, and here,- for potential interveners, material factors weigh
heavily.

In a shorthand measurement, these factors may be entailed in

intervener's GNP, -military capability~ and domestic tranquility. It will
be difficult for poor and dissension-ridden countries to send many men
abroad.

The army might not be considered trustworthy, and/or could be

needed for domestic purposes.

The Egyptian-Yemen experience shows the

sacrifice poor countries can make; the US-Vietnam experience shows the
efforts governments of dissension-ridden countries can muster. But the
odds seem great against intervention by any country with both problems.
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Finally, the perceived ability of disputing factions to pay the
political price of obtaining outside aid seems closely related to their
motivations to pay, and somewhat less related to material than to political factors.

The material resources of factions are important if

intervener requests greater effort from the faction in return for intervener's support.
influence

·j

In this connection, factions' willingness to pay may

ntervener s wi 11 i ngness to pay . However, f~cti ans
I

I

ability

to pay also depends on political skill ( in avoiding outside domination),
on the strength of the faction's organization, on the ineptitude of the
faction's opponents, and on the willingness of the population to accept
that faction's rule--even if the majority does not necessarily desire
it.

If these political circumstances seem favorable to the faction,

its leaders may feel quite able and willing to pay the costs of outside aid--though if the political situation seems favorable enough, thP
perceived need for outside support may decrease (depending, of course,
on the military situation as well).
/

VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH PERCEIVED PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
Detennination of the plausible alternatives to intervention depends on the circumstances of specific cases.

If costs of interven..J

tion seem high, or if cost-tolerance is low, more alternatives will
be sought and more wfll seem acceptable.

Openness to alternatives

depends, in part, on parties' willingness to negotiate short of intervention.

In turn, willingness to negotiate depends on factors such

as cost tolerance for intervention, fatigue, value placed on goals,
public pressure (or the pressure of domestic disputes) on leaders,
past interventionary experience, and the support or opposition of
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other countries.

When large powers have already intervened in a target,

other large or small powers may find reasons not to intervene; they may
look to such alternatives as international organizations to avoid spreading the conflict.

Thus it is hypothesized that factors increasing the

perceived cost of intervention, or decreasing cost tolerance, will indirectly increase the search for alternatives by interveners or factions
calling for intervention.
When large powers intervene on behalf of factions involved•in domestic
disputes, costs of inter~ention may play less of a role than when small
powers intervene, however.

If the faction calling for aid seems to be

holding its own, and if the dispute does not seem very severe, while
intervention might cost little, the large power may opt merely to aid
the faction with money or equipment.

If the dispute is severe, however

(measured by scope, duration, ideology, level of violence, or structural threat), or if the favored faction seems to be fading, few alternatives-to direct intervention may seem effective for major powers.
This seems to have been President Johnson's perception about Vietnam
in 1965; the fall of the Saigon -government seemed imminent.

Thus the

perceived threat to major values seemed to outweigh cost calculations
(though certain US decision-makers seem to have expected a relatively
short Vietnam intervention in 1965, and hence, perhaps relatively low
cost}.

It could be argued that intervention to prop up a losing side

is foolhardy; yet perceived threat to or opportunity to advance major
values may bring such interventions, as alternatives seem diminished.
(Major US values were evidently not implicated in the fall of Biafra.)
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Small powers, however, may be deterred from and may seek alternatives to direct intervention to support the government of a target
undergoing widespread upheaval, especially if the government seems to
be losing, since a prolonged war may be very costly.

President Nasser's

perception of the risks in Yemen shoul·d be studied in this connection,
since he may have shown less caution and considered fewer alternatives
than might have been predicted.

Perhaps he felt that the UAR held a

power advantage over adversaries in Yemen, regardless of the severity
of the dispute, or perhaps he did not at first see the dispute as
severe and likely to persist.
Large powers probably have more alternatives to intervention than
small powers, alternatives stemming mainly from their transactional
links. with many target states (Figure 6 portrays factors which may directly affect perceived alternatives.)

It is often less costly to manip-

ulate economic or political levers·than to "send the Marines." Major
powers may also utilize covert subversive measures to affect politics
in a target state.

Small powers may lack the resources for extensive

intelligence operations, and probably lack effective economic leverage
as well; their leaders may see little alternative to threatened or actual
military intervention, provided the expected costs are reasonable.
(FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE)
It has been hypothesized (Sullivan, 1969:7) that international
organizations may increase alternatives to direct intervention by large
or small powers.

This hypothesis requires careful testi·ng, however,

since, remembering such cases as Ethiopia in the 1930's and Hungary
in the l950's, we may doubt the efficacy of international organizations
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in this regard; they may increase the available alternatives to intervention j_f_ governments genuinely wish to avoid direct intervention.
The UN was an alternative to major power intervention in the Congo,
though the bitter UN experience may tend to preclude such operations
in the future, especially in cases of domestic disputes.
Factions within a state may seek alternatives to inviti,ng foreign
intervention in domestic disputes if the costs are too high and the
benefits too few (see Figures 2, 4, and 5).

It is reasonable that

factions will call for outside help mainly as a last resort, since
the need for such help is a sign of weakness and may represent a grievance for the local population.

Popular and well-organized factions may

see many alternatives to inviting intervention; unpopular or disorganized
factions may see few alternatives.

However, even relatively popular or

well-organized small power governments may invite foreign troops to help
protect them against opponents in the army at home or against other foreign countries (e.g~, Kenyan and East African requests for UK direct
intervention in 1966).
VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH PERCEIVED SUCCESS PROBABILITY
A potential intervener or faction calling for intervention may
have considered the alternatives in a threatening situation, understood the costs, determined it could pay them, and yet intervention
could be vetoed because it seems very unlikely to work.

As noted,

threat, opportunity, or cost perception, as well as willingness or
unwillingness to pay those costs, may lead to wishful thinking or exaggerated pessimism about success probability, but perceived success
probability depends on other factors as well.

One of these might be
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previous interventionary experience, with the target in question or
other targets (see Figure 7).

Memory of such experiences or negative

consequences associated with them may be distorted, of course, if pressing needs seem to call for inter.ention.

Decision-makers often seem

to recall precedents that justify policies they have already decided
upon--Munich, Greece, and Korea, as opposed to Laos, were frequentlY
cited precedents for Vietnam.
(FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE)
Prospective interveners may look seriously at the domestic conditions or disputes they hope to influence in the target state, and may
decide that military me_ans are not likely to bring success.

They may

note the organizational strength and leadership quality of certain
factions in the target state.- They may note the advantages certain
factions have in popular support, and intervention may be encouraged
or discouraged, depending on their hostility to or friendship with
such factions.

Furthermore, affective linkages with the potential

target may encourage an intervener (especially a small power) to
believe that it will be welcomed and successful in the target.

If

a hostile intervention is contemplated, however, the intervener's
size advantage over the target may encourage intervention despite
probable strong resistance.

Likely support or opposition by other

states, especially large powers, may also affect perceived success
probability indirectly by raising costs.

The USSR did not have to

fear forceful US opposition to the 1968 Czech intervention because
of the clear lesson of the 1956 Hungarian intervention; here previous
interventionary experience probably affected estimated success probability.

FIGURE 7
VARIABLES DIRECTLY AFFECTING PERCEIVED SUCCESS PROBABILITY
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The issues involved in an intervention may be important in determining success probability, and leaaers may not fully take stock of
such issues.

Territorial interventions may succeeed if the intervener

musters superior armed forces (though territorial administration is a
political rather than military problem).

Social protective interven- '

tion may be more complicated than territorial, and may be likely to
bring on competitive intervention by other powers (e.g., Greece vs.
Turkey in Cyprus).

Indeed, the goals of such interventions may be so

vague that it is difficult to know when an intervener succeeeds (when
are minorities protected?}.

Protecting a military base or embassy may

be somewhat easier than protecting an entire population group. Changes
in ideology may be achieved by eliminating certain individuals, and
affecting regional power balances may seem to require installation of
new governments.

Affording legitimacy to new leaders and governments

may be far more difficult than installing them, however.

Finally,

protecting economic interests through military force may require permanent occupation; it seems extremely difficult to forcefully compel
a target government to pay reparations or denationalize properties.
PROPOSITIONS AND TYPES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
A series of hypotheses, derived from the literature on foreign
military intervention and deduced from the post-World War II history
of foreign military interventions, has been related to the types of
cost-benefit calculations that might explain the occurrence or nonoccurrence of various types of military intervention. The typology
of military intervention presented has been based on the affect of
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intervention (hostile-friendly-neutral), the political circumstances
of intervention (in domestic disputes, affecting target's policies or
conditions, or entailing evacuations), and the political, economic,
or social issues involved in the intervention (territory, economic,
social, or diplomatic-military protection, ideology, or regional power
balances).

Perceptions of costs and benefits, as well as other vari-

ables which affect such perceptions, may help predict the occurrence
of particu1ar types of interventions, and, perhaps more importantly,
help derive explanations of interventions;· it may be possible to manipulate certa"in variables in order to affect perceptions, and, thereby,
the probab·i l i ty of various types of intervention.
So far, hypotheses have been related to the perception of costbenefit framework without clear specification of the types of intervention to which they apply.

However, if it is useful to break the

general intervention notion into specific categories, and if control
of various categories of intervention is to be achieved, it should be
possible to relate these hypotheses about perceptions and factors influencing them to the specific categories of intervention.

In this

way, particular variables which may affect particular types of intervention may be revealed, and some of these variables may prove manipulable.

A list of propositions and their sources (where no source is

specified, the proposition is attributable to the present author) discussed in this study or prominent in the intervention literature is
presented below and divided into those propositions most applicable to
intervention in general and those most applicable to specific types of
intervention.
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Propositions may apply to more than one category of intervention
and the reader should search for propositions under broader categories
(such as hostile or friendly) which might also apply to more specific
,

intervention issues (such as territorial interventions).

Few, if any,

of the propositions have been substantiated empirically.

Furthermore,

some propositions are stated with clearly specified and defined variables, variables which may be readily measured, while other propositions
contain vaguer concepts and less rigorous relationships between concepts.

this reflects the unevenness of the present state of interven-

tion theory.

Propositions must be refined and variables must be made

more specific and measurable.
PROPOSITIONS APPLICABLE TO INTERVENTIONS IN GENERAL
1.

Intervention decisions are conditioned mostly by idiosyncratic

characteristics of individual leaders, the roles, and situations that
leaders find themselves in, and the international system characteristics confronting leaders.

Societal variables and governmental struc-

ture variables have relatively little to do with the probability of intervention. (Rosenau, 1969:165-67.)
2.

The longer intervention continues, the more important societal vari-

ables may become for the outcome.
3.

The perceptions most important in leading decision-makers to inter-

vene concern the cost of intervention, the plausible alternatives to
intervention, leaders' cost tolerance for intervention, and the probability of successful intervention.
4.

Leaders contemplating foreign military intervention will weigh,

though perhaps not rigorously, perceived costs of intervention, including costs to their own careers or the interests of their own
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bureaucratic agencies, against perceived costs of non-intervention,
especially as affected by perceived threats to major values or perceived opportunity to advance major values.
5.

For leaders contemplating intervention, tolerance of the costs

of intervention consists of willingness as well as ability to pay
those costs, and depends on certain conditions within their own
country (such as elite, public, and military support) as well as
on perceived threat and perceived probability of successful intervention abroad.
6.

Leaders' perception of their own ability to pay the costs of in-

tervention help condition their willingness to pay those costs. In
turn, their willingness to pay those costs helps condition their perceived ability to pay.

Thei'r perceived ability to pay depends in

large measure, as well, upon their estimation of their own material
and military resources.
7.

Perceived alternatives to intervention are very important deter-

minants of intervention decisions and are likely to be affected by
perceived economic, military, and political means of influence short
of intervention.

..

Perceived alternatives are likely to be greater for

leaders of wealthy than for leaders of poor countries .
8.

Time constraints, especially under conditions of high perceived

threat, may preclude thought about the appropriateness and likely
success of a military response.
9.

Increased .threat perception tends to shorten perceived decision

time, and therefore, tends to lessen the number of alternatives considered by leaders contemplating intervention.
and 161 . )

(Hermann, 1969:129,158
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10.

The greater the costs and risks or uncertainty in a decision and

the more significant the changes in methods and goals ihvolved, the
more intense is the search for infonnation by leaders contemplating
intervention.
11.

(Burton, 1968:76-77.)

When objectively the success probability of interventions might

be low, optimistic and distorted evaluations of success probability
may be given to leaders because of advisers• conflicting objectives,
inter-agency rivalries, bureaucratic conformity, failure to reevaluate decisions or policies, desire to curry favor or obtain more of
the budget, or blind faith in militarily coerced solutions, or in
others I advice.
12.

The greater the perceived threat to or opportunity to promote

major values, the greater the perceived cost (political, military,
social, or economic) of not intervening.
13.

The higher the p~rceived value of intervention (threat or oppor-

tunity) and perceived probability of successful intervention, the
greater decision makers• willingness to pay the costs of intervention.
14.

The higher the perceived threat or opportunity in a situation,

the higher the perceived cost of non-intervention, and the lower the
perceived cost of intervention.

(Derived from cognitive dissonance

l i tera ture. )
15.

The higher the expected cost of an intervention, the lower the per-

ceived probability of successful intervention; the higher the perceived
probability of successful intervention, the lower the expected cost of
intervention. (Derived from cognitive dissonance literature.)
16.

The greater the threat or opportunity perceived in a situation,

the higher the perceived cost of not intervening, and the greater the
perceived probability of successful intervention; the greater the
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perceived probability of successful intervention, the higher the perceived cost of not intervening.

(Derived from cognitive dissonance

1 i tera ture.)

17.

The greater the perceived cost ·of not intervening, the lower the

•
perceived cost of intervention;
the greater the perceived cost of inter-

vention, the lower the perceived cost of not intervening.

(Derived

from cognitive dissonance literature.)
18.

The greater a leader's willingness to pay the costs of intervention,

the greater the probability of successful intervention perceived by that
1eader;

the greater the probabi·1 i ty of successful intervention perceived

by a leader, the greater that leader's willingness to pay the costs of
intervention.
19.

(Derived from cognitive dissonance literature.)

The greater the perceived cost of not intervening, the greater

the willingness to pay the costs of intervention; the greater the
willingness to pay the costs of intervention, the greater the perceived cost of not intervening.

(Derived from cognitive dissonance

literature.)
20.

The greater the perceived cost of intervention, the greater the

number of perceived plausible alternatives to intervention.
21.

The greater a leader's willingness to pay the costs of interven-

tion, the fewer plausible alternatives to intervention perceived by
that leader; the more plausible alternatives perceived by a leader,.
the greater the reluctance of that leader to pay the costs of intervention.
22.

(Derived from cognitive dissonance-literature.)

The greater a leader's perceived ability to pay the costs of in-

tervention, the lower the costs of intervention will seem to that
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leader; leaders' perceiving great costs in intervention will be likely
to perceive their own inability to pay the costs of intervention.
(Derived from cognitive dissonance literature.)
23.

The greater a leader's perceived ability to pay the costs of inter--

vention, the more plausible alternatives to intervention that leader
might perceive (since such leaders are likely to have significant economic and military resources), but perhaps such leaders will fail to
see increased alternatives since they need to see fewer alternatives
--they think they have the ability to pay.
24.

Leaders of both large and small powers are likely to perceive

threat in physical attacks upon their territory or citizens by governments of or groups in foreign states, and hence may be tempted to retaliate by intervening.
25.

As major values are threatened, intervention by certain large

powers may lead other large powers to intervene competitively (or
cooperatiVE!ly).
26.

Intervention by certain large powers may cause leaders of other

large powers to perceive great costs in competitive intervention, thus
decreasing the amount of competitive intervention.
27.

Previous interventionary experience in a certain target may cause

leaders to perceive greater or less threat or opportunity in certain
situations in that target.
28.

Depending on the nature of public, interest group, elite, or armed

forces discontent in their country, leaders may read discontent as a
sign that non-intervention will threaten their political future (if
discontent concerns alleged governmental softness in foreign policy)
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or as a si9n that intervention will threaten their political future
(if discontent concerns governmental "adventurousness'' or neglect of
domestic concerns).
29.

Common alliance membership between prospective intervener and

target probably reduces the cost of intervention expected by the
intervener.
30.

The costs of intervention. perceived by a leader may increase or

decrease depending upon whether that leader is supported or opposed
by the statements or actions of leaders in other powerful states; by
increasing or d~creasing costs, such support or opposition, especially
by large powers, may affect leaders' evaluation of intervention success probability.
31.

Usually interveners will intervene for their own interests, as

opposed to the interests of foreign factions; they may attempt to
strengthen foreign factions almost as a by-product or necessity of
intervention, sometimes inventing a faction where none exists, so
as to "legitimize" intervention.
32.

Leaders of countries that are both poor and dissension-ridden

are unlikely to undertake foreign military intervention.
33.

Leaders' willingness to negotiate short of intervention depends

on factors such as cost tolerance for intervention, public or military
fatigue, values placed on goals, public pressure (or the pressure of
domestic disputes), and the support or opposition of other countries.
34.

Factors increasing the perceived cost of intervention, or de-

creasing cost tolerance, will indirectly increase the search for alternatives by interveners or factions calling for intervention.
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35.

If leaders perceive the availability of a cooperative proxy.state

close to and powerful enough to intervene in a target, they may perceive more plausible alternatives to their own direct military intervention.
36.

Generally, international organizations may increase alternatives

to direct intervention perceived by large or small powers.

(Sullivan,

1969:7)
37.

Previous interventionary experience in a given target may affect

leaders' evaluation of the success probability of future interventions
in those targets.
PROPOSITIONS ABOUT HOSTILE FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION
1.

The greater the economic and military power advantage of prospec-

tive intervener over target, the less costly the intervention, especially hostile intervention, will seem to intervener's leaders.
2..

Small powers are unlikely to intervene, and especially to under-

take hostile intervention, in more powerful target states.

(Derived

from Young, 1968:180-81 .)
3.

Only major powers seem able to afford intervention at great geo-

graphic distances from home, and even they must feel assured of considerable power advantage over target before attempting hostile interq.

vention at great distances.
4.

Leaders of great and small powers alike may be reluctant to risk

the cost of intervention, ,especially hostile intervention, in targets
close to other major powers and friendly to those powers.
5.

Isolated countries or countries with very limited international

contacts are apt to be the targets of hostile military interventions.
(Sullivan, 1969:7.)
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6.

Intervention costs perceived by prospective interveners may seem

to rise if there is a prospect for resistance in the target or from
outside powers.
7.

If a hostile intervention is contemplated, the intervener's power

advantage over the target may encourage intervention despite 1i kely
strong resistance.
8.

To leaders contemplating intervention in a foreign state which is

a,lied to their country, intervention costs may seem minimal because
competitive intervention by a member of an opposing alliance may seem
unlikely and because international organizations or opposing major
powers may be reluctant to interfere in "alliance politics;"

thus,

leaders may undertake even hostile intervention in the affairs of an
ally.
9.

Widespread and prolonged structural and/or ideological disputes in

a country would seem to discourage pro-government while encouraging
anti-government interveners, as governmental weaknesses are highlighted.
10.

Linger'ing grievances against target governments or factions and

power advantages over them may increase interveners I willingness to pay
for hostile intervention.
]l.
11.

Hostile interventions are likely to seem costlier to a prospective

intervener than friendly interventions.
PROPOSITIONS REGARDING FRIENDLY FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION*
l.

Small powers may be deterred from and may seek alternatives to di-

rect intervention to support the government of a target undergoing
widespread upheaval, since a prolonged war may be very costly.
*See also Propos1t1ons about Hostile Interventions, Interventions in
Domestic Disputes, Interventions Affecting Policies or Conditions in
the Target, and Interventions in General.
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2.

Leaders of small countries, with personal or affective ties to

individuals or groups in a target stnte, may find many threats or
opportunities in these countries, and may anticipate low costs and
be willing to pay high costs when intervening in these countries.
Threats or opportunities to advance personal or affective interests
could lead to interventions in structural disputes, or in authority
and personnel disputes, since favored individuals may be displaced
from their jobs in such disputes.

Small powers will be more prone

than major powers to intervene for such interests.
3.

Friendly interventions will be perceived by prospective inter-

veners as less costly than hostile intervention.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT INTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC DISPUTES
l.

The severity, magnitude, or issues involved in a domestic dispute

are conditioning factors for foreign interventions in that domestic
dispute.
2.

(Sullivan, 1969:4)

Scope (area) of domestic dispute affects potential interveners'

perceived threat or opportunity, especially when geographic distance
between potential intervener and target is small.
3.

Geographic proximity and widespread domestic dispute in target

may increase the probability of interventions in domestic disputes,
as well as for territorial gain, social protection, regional power
balances, and desire to preempt or remedy threats.
4.

Scope or severity of domestic dispute may increase the costs of

intervention perceived by leaders contemplating intervention (since
a prospective defeat of a favored faction may be offset only with
considerable effort), especially leaders of small powers; thus, the
probability of intervention may decrease.
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5.

In a domestic dispute, appeals for outside intervention will be

made when the perceived threat to a faction's major values entailed
in "going it alone" exceeds the perceived cost of calling upon an
"external ally."
6.

(Mitchell, 1970:177-78.)

Cost tolerance for parties seeking outside intervention depends

on the severity of the domestic dispute in which they are engaged as
well as on their own probability of success without help.
7.

Structural war has a high probability of attracting foreign inter-

vention.
8.

(Rosenau, 1964:63-64.)

Ideological domestic disputes have a high probability of attracting

intervention by both large and small powers.

(Zartman, 1968:188; and

Boals, 1970.)
9.

Ideological disputes may serve as justifications for interventions

planned by those interested in imposing policies on a target state.
10.

In a situation where one nation is economically dominant over

another, the occurrence of disruption in the latter is likely to raise
fears in the dominant nation that its economic position will be affected
and perhaps ended; it will resort to intervention in the hopes of influencing the domestic conflict.
11.
tl.

(Sullivan', 1969:7.)

Threat or opportunity to advance major values perceived by leaders

of a faction plannincJ a request for outside intervention may be increased

by

increases in the severity of the domestic dispute con-

fronted

by

the faction.
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12.

If factions involved in intra-national disputes are well organized

and can count on at least the tolerance (if not support) of large segments of the local population, there may be little need to call for
outside intervention and little perceived costs (probability of losing
the fight or popular support) in not calling.

(Derived in ·part from

Leites and Wolf, 1970.)
13.

U~derdeveloped nations become prime targets for intervention be-

cause of the likelihood that civil disruption occurring there will become an international concern.
14.

(Sullivan, 1969:7.)

Rebel groups may be reluctant to call upon the aid of major foreign

powers if this will hurt them politically, for example, if there would
be domestic resentment of powerful foreign

11

intruders,'' or if the

group leaders suspect that the major power might attempt to dominate
them later.

Thus, a faction's popularity at home as well as the num-

ber of affective links between the faction's home country and the
prospective intervening country may influence decisions to call or
not to call for foreign intervention.
15.

Rebels' perception of costs of outside intervention may depend

on the prospects for quick governmental takeover; if outside aid could
assure quick takeover, there might not be time for public or regional
resentment of "foreign intruders;" perceived costs may increase greatly
if prospects are for a prolonged struggle, though the costs of such a
struggle without outside support may increase as well.
16.

The cost of intervention, as perceived by a faction potentially

calling for outside intervention, may be increased or decreased by the
prf'ssure, opposition (including intervention), or approval of other
~Lutes,

Jnd may be decreased by shared alliance membership with the

potential intervener.

17.

The greater the severity and salience of the domestic dispute

to the factions concerned, the greater their willingness to pay political costs in calling for outside intervention; thus, the greater
their cost tolerance.

This is especially true of governmental deci-

sions to seek outside support.
18.

Small powers' affective links

(including ideological links) with

a target would be likely to increase their leaders' willingness to act
militarily in that target, especially to intervene in domestic disputes.
79.

Widespread and prolonged structural and/or ideological disputes

would seem to discourage pro-government, while encouraging anti-government interveners, (especially small power interveners) as governmental
weaknesses are highlighted.
20.

Alternatives to intervention perceived by prospective interveners

are probably increased with increased viability of favored factions in
domestic d{sputes in a target; while willingness to intervene to support
a viable government or viable rebels may increase, the perceived necessity to intervene decreases and intervention in such circumstances may be
unlikely.
21.

For factions calling upon outside interveners, ability to pay for

intervention depends on political skill (in avoiding outside domination),
fj.

on the strength of the faction's organization, on the ineptitude of the
faction's opponents, and on the willingness of the population to accept
that faction's rule, (even if the majority does not necessarily desire
it).

22.

The ability and willingness of factions in domestic disputes to pay

the costs of outside intervention may be decreased if the power ratio
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between prospective intervener and target state is high; for a government involved in a domestic dispute, willingness to pay the costs of
outside intervention may be increased if prospective intervener shares
an alliance membership with the government and may be increased or decreased by pressure, opposition, or approval of other states.
23.

When large powers intervene on behalf of factions involved in

domestic disputes, costs of intervention may play a smaller role in
their decisions than in the decisions of small power interveners.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT INTERVENTION AFFECTING TARGET'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
POLICIES AND DOMESTIC CONDITIONS
l.

Both large and small powers may perceive threats in the interest

and potential intervention of other states in a particular target; preemptive or preventive intervention could follow to deter such third
party interventions.
2.

If major powers have many military, ideological, strategic or eco-

nomic interests in a foreign state, leaders of the large power are likely
to perceive threats warranting intervention if leaders of the smaller
state change policy quickly, or if conditions in the economic, ideological, strategic, or military areas in the smaller state change rapidly
--even in the absence of domestic disputes in the small state.
3.

Geographic proximity between prospective intervener and target states

may increase the probability of intervention to change certain policies
in the target even in the absence• of a domestic dispute in the target.
4.

Leaders of small powers may perceive threats warranting interven-

tions in foreign states if leaders of the foreign state change policy
quickly or domestic conditions in the foreign state change quickly
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PROPOSITIONS ABOUT EVACUATIONS
1.

Interventions for evacuation of foreign nationals or for protec-

tion of embassies and other

diplomatic-military interests seem less

likely than other forms of intervention to be influenced by geographic
distance ca.lculations; large powers seem most likely to have such interests far from home and are capable of pursuing them even at great
distances.
2.

Leader5; of both large and small powers are 1 ikely to perceive threat

in physical attacks upon their citizens by governments of or groups in
foreign states, and may be tempted to intervene to protect such citizens;
however, since many alternatives to direct intervention can also achieve
evacuation of threatened citizens, it is likely that no direct interven~
tion without the permission of the target government will take place unless the intervention also concerns domestic disputes or polic:1es and
conditions in the target.
3.

If governmental leaders are engaged in a severe domestic conflict.

and seek outside help, it is likely that the initial rationale for suc,h_
for~ign intervention will be evacuation of endangered~itizens~

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT TERRITORIAL INTERVENTIONS·
1.

If interveners desire to take foreign terHto'ry or punish· foreign

adversaries, little thought may be given to the long range impacts" and
consequences of the intervention on intervening and target states.··. '
2.

If a state, is undergoing a severe domestic dispute, nearby states

may raise territorial issues and claims, especially if the conflict
tends to spill across borders.
3.

Most small power interventions seem likely to entai.l territorial

or social interests close to home.
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4.

Large powers do not seem as likely as small powers to undertake:,
•

>

{-·:.

territorial or social protective intervention because sue~ issues··
have probably been settled for most great or super powers.

5.

Territorial interventions may be spurred by

11

lateral pressure"

within the intervening state, i.e., by the pressure' of population .on
scarce land and/or resources.

6.

(Derived from Choucri. and ~orth, 1972.)

Territorial interventions may succeed if the intervener mu~ters

superior armed forces so that control of the territory may b.e wrested
from the opposing armed forces; territorial administration and l~ng~
range control, however, is. a political rath~r than military pro~lein
and requires the employment of civil servant's' and administrators· as
well as occupying military troops; probability of successfUl long-~erm
administration is low if administrative control contiriues to r.est·with
11

foreigners. 11

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT ECONOMIC PROT~CTIVE INTERVENTIONS
l.

Most states I economic interests are unlikely to be concentrated in

nearby states, since most states are unlikely to find resources and
markets close to home; therefore, interveners and targets involveq, in"
economic protective interventions are unlikely to be located near each
other.
2.

Large powers are more likely than small powers to undertake ecoryomk

protective intervention.
3.

Most large power interventions are likely to be concerned with near-

by or distant military, strategic, and economic interests in smaller

states.
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4.

If one nation is economically dominant over another, the occur-

rence of disruption in the latter is likely to raise fears in the dominant nation that its economic position will be affected and perhaps
ended, and it will resort to intervention in the hopes of influencing
the domestic conflitt or protecting the economic interests.

(Derived

from Sullivan, 1969:7.)
5.

Small powers are likely to have few transactional links with other

small statE~s and relatively many with powerful states; however, power
disadvantage is likely to discourage small power economic-protective
interventions.

Large powers' transactional as well as ideological and

· alliance links to targets may increase large powers' willingness to
sacrifice to affect targets' policies, conditions, or factions.
6.

Large powers have more alternatives to intervention than small

powers, alternatives stemming mainly from their transactional links
with many target states; these links may increase the threat perceived
to economic or diplomatic-military interests. but may also increase
the perceived available alternatives to deal with those threats.
7.

Protecting economic interests through military intervention may re-

quire long-term or even permanent military occupation of the target
or of the area containing the economic interest.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT SOCIAL PROTECTIVE INTERVENTIONS
l.

Most small power interventions seem likely to entail territorial

or social interests close to home.
2.

Large powers are not as likely as small powers to undertake ter-

ritorial or social protective intervention.
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3.

The probability of small powers pressing territorial or irreden-

tist claims may be increased by population pressure on land and resources.
4.

(Derived from Choucri and North, 1972.)

Social protective intervention may be more politically complicated

than territorial intervention, may require repeated military interven~
tions, and may be likely to bring on competitive intervention by other
powers.
5.

Wi desprE!ad and severe domestic disputes in a country may lead for-

eign states to intervene if segments of the mass public are threatened
or attacked by disputing political factions.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT DIPLOMATIC-MILITARY PROTECTIVE INTERVENTION
l.

Because the diplomatic and military interests and installations of

major powers extend-to many countries around the globe, major power interventions are more likely than minor power interventions to concern
diplomatic-military interests, and such major power interventions are·
not likely to be influenced by the geographic proximity of the ·target.
2.

The strategic concern of state A for state Bis likely to be re-

flected in or increased by the number of A's military and diplomatic
installations inside B; many such installations mean that A is likely
to perceive greater threat to or opportunity to advance major interests
in events in 8 as opposed to other countries and that A's willingness
to intervene in B will be greater than in other countries.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT IDEOLOGICAL FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION
l.

Ideological disp~tes in a country have a high probability of at-

tracting foreign military intervention by either large or small powers.
(Zartman, 1968:188; and Boals, 1970.)
•
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2.

Ideological disputes may serve as justifications for interventions

planned for other reasons, such as trying to impose policy changes on
the target state.
3.

When international ideological rivalry is intense, decision-makers

are more likely to attach greater import to possible governmental changes
abroad than is the case when blueprints of the future are less salient
features of international life.
4.

(Rosenau, 1969:168.)

Large powers are most likely to perceive threats, warranting con-

sideration of intervention (to affect policies, conditions, or domestic
disputes), to ideological and transactional interests in other countries,
as well as to strategic interests in the

11

stability 11 of certain regions;

such interests are likely to seem threatened by severe ideological and
structural disputes in states where there are many military, ideological,
strategic and economic large power interests.
5.

Interventions by small powers are often conditioned by 11 affective 11

links to the target including ideological ties or conflicts.
6.

Affective linkages with the potential target may encourage an inter-

vener, especially a smpll power intervener, to believe that it will be
welcomed and successful in the target.
7.

Widespread and prolonged structural and/or ideological disputes

in a target state would seem to discourage pro-government while encouraging anti-government interveners as governmental weaknesses are
highlighted.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT INTERVENTIONS AFFECTING REGIONAL POWER BALANCES
1.

Large powers are most likely to perceive threats, warranting con-

sideration of intervention, to ideological and transactional interests,
as well as to strategic interests in the

11

stability 11 of certain regions.
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2.

Small powers may perceive threats to interests in the

11

stability 11

of their own region if they are involved in ideological competition in
the region or have a long-standing territorial or social dispute with
another small power in the region.
3.

-

Desire for regional inMuenc~ probably increases both large and·

small powers' willingness to sacrifice for foreign policy goals including intervention in foreign states; such interventions. may often
be based on conceptions of a desirable regional balance of power.

4.

Interventions affecting regional balance of power may seem to

require either inflicting a severe beating on the target state's military power or installing a new government in the target state; the
costs of such interventions may, therefore, seem great; the perceived
success probability of interventions to ,install a new government in
the target state may seem low if prospective interveners are aware of
the political complications that might artse.
CONCLUSION
Obviously, the quality of propositions about foreign military
intervention varies and this presents problems in trying to combine
propositions to form explanations.

An explanation requires that we

be able to say why we think a certain generalization is true, and
express the reasons in specific propositions or hypotheses which can
be linked logically to produce the generalization in question.

In

, this sense, the present study does not constitute a complete explanation
of foreign military intervention.

However, the redefinition, classifi-

cation, and perceptual framework presented here constitute a first
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step toward explanation because certain specific types of interventions
are linked to certain types of independent variables.
The variables which seem most likely to affect hostile intervention, are those having to do with the potential strengths of the target state and its government.

Hostile intervention decisions, related

to regional strategic interests or concern about policy or conditions·
or disputes in the target, are likely to be affected by the perceived
military pm'ler ratio between intervener and target as well as by geographic distances and likely resistance inside the target.

The position

of major powers, particularly those in the region of the target, will
also be weighed.
Oecisi-0ns to undertake or not to undertake friendly interventions
(also related to regional strategic interests and policies, conditions,
or disputes in the target) on the other hand, seem more influenced·by
the affective links between intervener and target, and by the evident
· viability of the ta rg.et state I s government, in the case of sma 11 country
interveners and by tra~sactional ties expected viability of target
government in the case of major power interveners.

If the government

seems a good bet to survive, especially in a domestic dispute, friendly
intervention becomes more thinkable.

In general, decisions about

intervention in domestic disputes will relate to the severity (level
of violence, areal scope, duration, etc.) of the domestic dispute.
Severity will influence the probability that factions inside a state
will request outside intervention and that outside interveners will
respond to such reque~ts.

At the same time, the decisions of out-

side ihterveners are likely to depend, in part, on the kinds of
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interests they have in target states, and these interests will vary
according to the level of power of the intervening state.

Small powers

are likely to be concerned with territorial and social interests in
nearby states, as well as with affective and ideological ties to those
states.

Major powers, on the other hand, are less likely to be bound

by geographical restraints to their international interests, and will
be concerned about economic, ideological, regional ·balance of power,
and military-diplomatic inte.rests in states in various regions.

Small

powers under certain circumstances, may also develop keen interests
in regional power balances and diplomatic interests in their own region.
The categories of intervention used in this study seem to describe
the pattern of interventions since World War II.

Certain variables

may be associated with the occurrence of some types of intervention and
not others, and certain types of states seem most likely to undertake
certain types of intervention.

For these reasons, the typology of

intervention presented here seems useful in distinguishing typical
patterns of intervention and various consequences of intervention.

In-

terventions in domestic.or social disputes, for instance, seem to entail long-term involvement in the politics or social relations of the
target state.

Indeed, 13 of 14 hostile and 23 of 42 friendly inter-

ventions (codable for duration) in domestic disputes since 1948 (see
Appendix) lasted longer than six months.

Troops, present in the target

for long periods are likely to influence the economy of the target state
and to add to political and social resentments.

While some interventions

affecting targets' policies or conditions (as opposed to domestic disputes) may be prolonged, disruptive impacts on targets' polity, economy
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and society may not arise as often from relatively short term evacuation
interventions, reprisal raids to influence policies or conditions, or
territorial interventions as from social protective intervention or
intervention in domestic disputes.

More empirical study of interven~

tions' impacts are necessary, but the categorization presented here
seems likely to distinguish different types of impacts rather well.
Thus, intervention profiles emerge.

The intervention syndrome

of the sma l"I power intervener, the sma 11 under-developed country target, the major power alliance member, the small power alliance member,
the former colonial power (which has retained economic interests abroad),
and other types of states can be distinguished.

Typical patterns of

· Jnterventions in domestic disputes as contrasted with interventions
I

affecting policies or conditions in the target can be identified.
Complete explanations for various categories of intervention remain elusive:

perhaps some categories will have to be further refined

and subdivided in order to produce more homogeneous units of analysis
--perhaps Israel's interventions to affect targets' policies or condi. tions are different from those of the United States or Ethiopia (indeed, Israel seems very prone to 11 preemptive 11 or 11 remedial 11 intervention in dealing with Arab terrorists~-interventions often bypassing
the government of the target state in order to directly eliminate offending conditions or groups inside the target).

Diplomats might ar-

gue that each intervention has its own particular explanation, and
that generalizations are dangerous if not impossible.

The social

scientist, on the other hand, would argue that at least some generalization is possible and desirable; the problem is to determine what
incidents can profitably be compared.

Careful study of the actions of
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troops in various target states, the consequences of the interventions,
and the cost~benefit calculations of decision-makers allows more effective comparison.
We now have some idea of the variables which might be important in
affecting certain intervention decisions.

The next step is to look at

specific decisions and determine whether the predicted variables actually were influential.

Were decision-makers undertaking hostile in-

terventions aware of and optimistic about the force capabilities of
their own country vs. the target or third countries? Were friendly
interveners mainly preoccupied with and optimistic about the staying
power of favored factions inside the target? Were factions involved
in domestic disputes inclined to call for outside interventions .at times
when.the disputes were severe as opposed to mild? Were interveners more
inclined to respond to calls when disputes were severe as opposed to
mild?
Perceptions are quite difficult to measure.

Content analysis

of speeches and statements as well as official documents could reveal
the way decision makers structured the world/ thorough analysis of
their private communications, diaries, interviews, and other sources
must be used to derive conclusions about perceptions.

The rigorous

research methods of the historians must be adopted to supplement the
aggregate data analysis frequently used by international relations
specialists.

It is necess·ary to determine what troops actually did

when they entered a country and what decision-makers thought the
problems and interests inside that country were.
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In additibn, researchers must be more creative and resourceful
in measuring variables associated with interventions.

Certain vari-

ables, such as factions' organizational strength or leadership qualities, public toleration of factions, affective links, desire for
regional influence, or interests in regional stability may be very
difficult to measure.

It may be easier to determine leaders' or

observers' perceptions about such variables than to measure them
11

objectively. 11

Factions' organizational strength, as reported by

media, may be an important consideration for decisions about interventions in domestic disputes, and may be easier to determine than
some 11 objective 11 assessment of organizational strength.

Perceptual,

behavioral, and aggfegate data must be used in the study of intervention to measure variables from different angles.

Certain variables,

such·as geographic distance, levels of economic investment, duration
of do~estic dispute, may be measured relatively easily (although important measurement problems will remain), and these variables should
soon be tested in accounting
for the variance (occurrence -and non,
occurrence) of each type of intervention.

Also, inter-relationships

among predictor variables must be specified.

For example, the exist-

ence of transactional linkages between countries is probably related
to levels of gross national product or military capability, and such
an inter-relationship could affect analyses which included all of these
variables in predicting intervention variation.

Accounting for such

inter-relationships is part of good theorizing; perhaps some variables
could be eliminated while others could be combined to simplify and
reconcile propositions containing the most important variables predicting interventions.
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Finally, some of the variables identified in the perceptual framework may be manipulated by those interested in controlling the effects
of intervention.

Military power ratios and the prospects for resistance

in targets may deter interventions under some circumstances; states may
seek to change such ratios or prospects.

Level of perceived threat to

certain interests could be eliminated by certain changes in policy.
If foreign leaders express concern about threats to their interests
in a country, leaders of that country might try policies of reassurance
and might take steps to remedy the grievance.

Transactional linkages

could be diminished in some cases to reduce threats to certain interests
(e.g., limiting foreign investment or ownership of property}.

Leaders

may attempt to change public opinion in order to.lessen costs of nonintervention.

Citizens may attempt to raise the cost of intervention

by open opposition to interventionary policies.

International organi-

zations may prove useful alternatives to direct intervention.

Certain

policy changes may make certain factions in domestic disputes more
popular or efficient, thus affecting intervention cost and success
probability calculations.

Reforms of bureaucracies and decisional

processes may decrease the probability of severely distorted perceptions.

In general, it is possible to take advantage of the complex

inter-connections among intervention perceptions by manipulating variables affecting one type .of perception so that it may, in turn, affect
other perceptions--as when increased perceived costs lead to greater
search for and perception of alternatives to intervention.

Further

study of the consequencesp political, social, and economic, of various
types of intervention in various targets may afford better ideas of
the most necessary and effective controls on intervention.

APPENDIX
A data setting with interventions was available as this study
was undertaken, but it was thought best to re-collect, re-code, and
augment the data because of certain conceptual and methodological
problems. 1 Therefore, all events in the existing data lists were
checked in the New York Times and other sources.

Additional informa-

tion about the events and surrounding political circumstances was provided by scholarly histories of the interventions (Indonesia-Malaysia,
for example).

Every event was provided with a specifiable political

or conflict context, thus eliminating unexplained ot perhaps random
skirmishes or incursions (such as an apparently isolated border incident).

In addition, the data were supplemented with interventions re-

ported by Luard and Bloomfield (1968:62-64, 96; Luard, 1970:8-9;
Bloomfield and.Beattie, 1971:33-46) and in several regional chronologies.
The final data list used in this study is presented and categorized
in this Appendix; the original data were used only as a starting point,
and they have been changed so much that the author alone bears responsibility for the results. 2 In the final data set, distinction is made
between interventions alleged by some government or faction, and those
reported "factually" (still not completely substantiated, of course)
by non-government media, by scholars, or admitted by intervening governments.

Political and conflict context were determined from statements

by governments involved, and by issues reported in the press ,or by
scholars.

2

Here are the sources used in deriving this data:
1.

New York Times

2.

Associated Press

). Asian Recorder
4.

African Research Bulletin

5.

Middle East Journal

6.

Middle Eastern Affairs

7.

Hispanic American Report

8.

Radio Free Europe Files

9.

Facts on File

10. African Diary
11.

L'Annee Politigue

12.

Keesings Contemporary Archives

13.

H. D. Purcell, Cyprus, (New York:

Frederick A. Praeger,

Inc., 1969)
14.

Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, (Syracuse, New
University Press, 1968)

15.

Nadav Safran, From War to War, (New York:

Pegasus, 1969)

16.

Harold James and Denis Sheil-Small, The Undeclared War:

The

Story of the Indonesian Confrontation 1962-1966, (Totowa,
New Jersey:
17.

Rowman and Littlefield, 1971)

David Rees, Korea:

The Limited War, (Baltimore, Maryland:

Penguin Books Inc., 1970)
18.

The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, The Indochina
Story, (New York:

Pantheon Books, 1970)
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19.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch

20.

The Economist

21.

Marcus G. Raskin, and Bernard B. Fal 1 (eds.), The Viet-Nam
Reader, (New York:

22.

The Pentagon Papers, vol. I, (The Senator Gravel Edition;
Boston:

23.

Beacon Press, n.d.)

Th~ Pentagon Papers, vol. IV, (The Senator Gravel Edition;
Boston:

26.

Beacon Press, n.d.)

The Pentagon Papers, vol. III, (The Senator Gravel Edition;
Boston:

25.

Beacon Press, n.d.)

The Pentagon Papers, vol. II, (The Senator Gravel Edition;
Boston:

24.

Beacon Press, n.d.) ·

Neil Sheehan etal., The Pentagon Papers, (The New York Times.,
ed.; New York:

27.

Vintage Books, 1965)

Bantam Books, 1971)

Michael Leifer, Cambodia, (New York:

Frederick A. Praeger,

Inc., 1967)
28.

Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, (Ithaca, New York:

29.

Cornell University Press, 1965)

Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand (London:

Andre Deutsch, Ltd.,

1969)

-University Press, 1961)

30.

Hugh Tinker, The Union of.Burma (3rd Ed.), (London:

31.

Robert Blum, The United States and China
(New York:

--

in

McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966)

Oxford

World.Affairs,

tl

32.

Leon V. Sigal, "The Rational Policy' Model and the Formosa
1

Straits Crises, 11 International Studies Quarterly, vol. 14
no. 2 (June 1970) p. 121-156
33.

Charles A. McClelland~

11

Action Structures and Communication

in Two International Crises:

Quemoy and Berlin, 11 p. 473-482,

in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign
Policy, (New York:

The Free Press, 1969)

34. _Edgar 0'Ballance, Malaya:
(London:
35.

The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-60,

Faber & Faber Limited, 1966)

J.M. Gullick, Malaya, (New York:
1963)

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,

List of Interventions~ 1948-67
A=Alleged {By a Government or Political Group)
R=Reported (By Non-Goverrmental Media or Scholars)
!=Hostile
II=Friendly
,
III=Neutral or Non-supportive
l=In Domestic Dispute
2=To Affect Policies or Conditions if no Dispute
3=Pre-emptive or Remedial
a=Territorial
. b=Social Protective
c=Economic Protective
d=Military-Diplomatic Protective
e=Evacuation
f=Ideological
g=Regional Power Balance
DATE
TARGET

INTERVENER

AIII,3,

Feb. 25, 1958

Spain (Sp. Sahara)

France

AI2,3,

Dec. 21 , 1961

Senegal

Portugal

AI2

Apr. 8, 1963

Senegal

Portugal

AI2

Jan., 1965

Senegal

Portugal

RIIl

Jan. 13, 1960

Cameroon

France

RI Ile

Apr., 1964

Gabon

United States

RI Il d

Feb. 19, 1964

Gabon

France

A2,3

Mar. 16, 1964

Central African Rep.

Sudan

RI Il

Nov. 11' 1967

Central African Rep.

France

All

Feb. 14, 1965

Congo (Kinshasa)

Uganda

RIIl

Jul. 10, 1967

Congo (Kinshasa)

United States

RI 11

Aug. 13, 1964

Congo (Kinshasa)

United States

RI I 1e

Nov. 23, 1964

Congo (Kinshasa)

United States

RIil ,3,c,d,e

Jul. 10, 1960

Congo {Kinshasa)

Belgium

RIIle

Nov. 23, 1964

Congo (Kinshasa)

Belgium

RIIlb,e

Jul. 23, 1960

Congo (Kinshasa)

United Nations

RI Il

Jul., 1967

Congo (Kinshasa)

Ethiopia

A2

Feb., 1967

Congo (Kinshasa)

Portu9al

RI Il

Jul. 20, 1967

Congo (Kinshasa)

Ghana

A2

Sept. 10, 1965

Congo (Brazzavi 11 e)

Congo (Kinshasa)

2
RII2

Aug. 1963

Congo (Brazzaville)

France

RI Il d

Jan. 24, 1964

Kenya

United Kingdom

RII l d

Jan. 23, 1964

Uganda

United Kingdom

A2,3

Sept. 16, 1965

Uganda

Sudan

AI2

Mar. 26, 1965

Uganda

Congo (Kinshasa)

A2

Nov. 29, 1966

Tanzania

Portugal

RI Il d

Jan. 25, 1964

Tanzania

United Kinqdom

RIIIe

Jan. 12, 1964

Zanzibar

United Kingdom

RI Ile

Jan. 13, 1964

Zanzibar

United States

AI2a

Nov. 1963

Dahomey

Niger

A2

Oct. 1966

Malawi

Portugal

Rila,b

Feb. 1964

Ethiopia

Somalia

All a ,b

June 11, 1965

Ethiopia

Somalia

Aila,b

Nov. 1963

Ethiopia

Somalia

All a, b

Apr. 1966

Ethiopia

Soma 1i a

Ai2a

Feb, 6, 1964

Somalia

Ethiopia

AI2a

Apr. 1966

Somalia

Ethippia

RII2, 3

Dec. 3, 1965

Zambia

United Kingdom

AI2,3

Nov, 1966

Zambia

Portugal

RIil ,3, g

Aug. 23, 1967

Rhodesia

South Africa

RI2,3

May 19, 1956

Tunisia

France

RI2,3,d

Feb 8, 1958

Tunisia

France

AI2

Feb. 14, 1959

Tunisia

France

AI2d

July 19, 1961

Tunisia

France

RIIl

March, 1964

Tanganyika

Nigeria

R3d

July 3, 1956

Morocco

France

A2

May 21, 1958

Morocco

France

AI2,3

Oct. 7, 1961

Morocco

France

,I
II
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AI2

July, 1962

Morocco

France

AI2a

Oct. 8, 1963

Morocco

Algeria

AI2a

July, 1%2

Morocco

A1geri a

A2

Feb. 26, 1965

Guinea

Portugal

AI2a

Oct. 14,

Algeria

Morocco

AI2a

July 6, 1962

Algeria

Morocco

A2.

June 1962

France (Algeria)

Morocco

AI2

Oct. 1957

Libya

France

A2,3

Feb. 1964

Burundi

Rwanda

AI2 ,3

Sept. 10, 1966

Sudan

Chad

AI2

Mar. 18, 1967

Sudan

Ethiopia

AII 1

July 26, 1963

Cuba

USSR

A

Sept. 6, 1963

Cuba

United States

RII 13d

July 28, 1958

Cuba

United States

AIII3

Aug. 15, 1963

U.K. (Bahamas)

Cuba

RIIld,e,f,g

Apr. 28, 1965

Dominican Republic

Uni terl States

RIIIlb,d,e

May 23, 1965

Dominican Republic

OAS

AIII2,3,c,g

Dec. 31, 1958

Mexico

Guatemala

RI Ile

Apri 1 11 , 1948

Columbia

United States

Mar. 1948

Costa Rica

Nicaragua

All

Dec. 11, 1948

Costa Rica

Nicaragua

AI

Nov. 1959

Cos ta Rica

Nicaragua

AI2a

Apr. 1957

Honduras

Nicaragua

AI

Feb. 1960

Honduras.

Nicaragua

AI2a

May 1957

Nicaragua

Honduras

AI2a

Nov. 1965

Chile

Argentina

A12a,b,e

Nov. 1965

Argentina

Chile

RI Il

June 17, 1953

East Germany

USSR

AIIl

1963
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AII2,3,f

Nov. 1956

Bulgaria

USSR

AI

Apr. 4, '1948

Bulgaria

Greece

RI2,3,f

May 7, 1949

Bulgaria

Greece

A

Apr. 19, 1950

Bulgaria

Greece

A

1953

Poland

USSR

Rl , f, g

Oct. 20, 1956

Pol and

USSR

Rlll,f,g

Oct. 24, 1956

Hungary

USSR. ·

AI

Oct. 27, 1949,

Hungary

Yugoslavia

AI

Apr. 18, 1948

A1 bani a

Greece

AI2,3,f

Aug. 2, 1949

Albania

Greece

AI

1959

Albania

Greece

A

Sept. 6, 1948

Yugoslavia

Greece

AI

May 30, 1949

Yugoslavia

Greece

AI2

Apr. 16, 1950

Yugos 1avi a

Bulgaria

AI

Sept. 6, 1953

Yugoslavia

Bulgaria

AI

Apr. 23, 1951

Yugos 1avi a

Rumania

'AI2a

Dec. 1951

Yugos 1avi a

Hungary

AI

Mar. 1952

Yugoslavia

Albania

All , f

Sept. 8, 1948

Greece

Yugoslavia

AI

Oct, 1948

Greece

Albania

AI2a

July 26,. 1952

Greece

Bulgaria

Rb

Dec. 25, 1963

Cyprus

Greece

Rb

June 1964

Cyprus

Greece

Rb

De C, 2 5 , 196 3

Cyprus

Turkey

Rb

June 1964

Cyprus

Turkey

Rb

Dec. 30, 1963

Cyprus

United Kingdom

RIIIlb

Mar. 27, 1964

Cyprus

United Nations

5
Rilb,f

May 15, 1948

Israel

E~ypt

Ril b, f

May 15, 1948

Israel

Iraq

RI2,g

Jurie 6, 1967

Israel

Iraq

Rila,b,f

May 15, 1948

Israel

Jordon

RI2,g

June 5, 1967

Israel

Jordon

Rilb,f

May 15, 1948

Israel

Syria

RI2,g

June 5, 1967

Israel

Syria

Rllb,f

May 15, 1948

Israel

Lebanon

Rilb,f

May 15, 1948

Israel

Saudi Arabia

Rilb,f

May 15, 1948

Israel

Yemen

RIl 2a, f, g

June l ' 1948

Jordon

Israel

AI2a

Aug. 27, 1950

Jordon

Israel

RIII2,3

Oct. 1953

Jordon

Israel

RIII2,3

May 27, 1965

Jordon

Israel

RIII2,3

Sept. 2, 196.5

Jordon

Israel

RIII2,3

Apr. 29, 1966

Jordon

Israel

R,III2,3

Nov. 13, 1966

Jordon

Israel

RI2,3,a,g

June, 1967

Jordon

Israel

RII3,g

Mar. 1949

Jordon

United Kingdom

Ril13,g

July 17, 1958

Jordon

United Kingdom

RIIl ,3,q

July 17, 1958

Jordon

United States

RI2,f,g

May 23, 1948

Lebanon

Israel

RIII2,3

Oct. 28, 1965

Lebanon

Israel

RIIl ,f,g

July 15, 1958

Lebanon

United States

RI2,f,g

May 1948

Syria

Israel

RIII2,3,a

Dec. 10, 1955

Syria

Israel

RI2,3,a

March 16, 1962

Syria

Israel
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RI2,3a

Nov. 13, 1964

Syria

Israel

RI2,3

July 14, 1966

Syria

Israel

RI2,3

Apr. 7 1967

Syria

Israel

RI2,3a,g

June 1967

Syria

Israel

RIII2,3

Feb. 28, 1955

Egypt

Israel

RI2,3

Nov. l, 1955

Egypt

Israel

RI2,3,g

Oct. 29, 1956

Egypt

Israel

RI2,3a,d,g

June 5, 1967

Egypt

Israel

RI2,3 c,g

Oct. 31 , 1956

Egypt

United Kinqdom

RI2,3c,g

Oct. 31 , 1956

Egypt

France

Nov. 15, 1956

Egypt (UAR)

United Nations

AI2a

Feb, 1958

Egypt

Sudan

RI2,3,g

June 1967

Iraq

Israel

AI2

Aug. 16, 1962

Iraq

Turkey

RIIl

June 1963

Iraq

Syria

AI2,3

Aug, 15, 1962

Turkey

Iraq

RI2a

Feb. 1958

Sudan

Egypt

RI2,3

Nov. 1962

Saudi Arabia

UAR

AI2,3

Mar. 1965

Saudi Arabia

UAR

AI2,3

Oct. 14, 1966

Saudi Arabia

UAR

AI2,3

Jan. 27, 1967

Saudi Arbia

UAR

AI2,3

May 11, 1967

Saudi Arabia

UAR

P.12

Oct. 1955

Saudi Arabia

United Kingdom

RII2, g

Sept. 2, 1949

South Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

United Kingdom

R,g

Apr. 1952

So. Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

United Kingdom

RII2,g

May 1956

So. Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

United Kingdom

· RIII,g
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RII2,g

Aug. 1957

South Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

United Kinqdom

R2,g

July 1966

South Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

United Ki nqdom

AI2a

May 1, 1954

South Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

Yemen

AI2a

Jan. 1957

South Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

Yemen

AI2

July 30, 1966

South Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

UAP

AI2 ,3 ,g

Sept. 1949

Yemen

United Kinqdom

A12 ,g

June 1956

Yemen

United Kingdom

Al2,g

Jan. 1957

Yemen

United Kingdom

Al2,g

July 1959

Yemen

United Kingdom

All ,g

Mar. 1965

Yemen

United Kingdom

RI 11 , f

Oct. 1962

Yemen

UAR

RII3c ,g

July- 1, 1961

Kuwait

United Kingdom

RII3,g

July 2, 1961

Kuwait

Saudi Arabia

RII3

Sept. 1961

Kuwait

Arab League

AI2a

Oct. 1955

Muscat and Oman

Saudi Arabia

RII2

Oct. 1955

Muscat and Oman

United Kingdom

RIIlc ,g

July 1957

Muscat and Oman

United Kingdom

AI 11

May 1958

Muscat and Oman

United Kingdom

RIIlc ,g

Nov. l , 1958

Muscat and Oman

United Kinqdom

AI2a

Oct. 1955

Abu Dhabi

Saudi Arabia

RII2

Oct. 1955

Abu Dhabi

United Kin9dom

RII2

Sept. 15, 1953

Abu Dhabi

United Kingdom

RI

June 12, 1949

Afghanistan

Pakistan

AI2a

Sept. 3 0, 1950

Pakistan

Afghanistan
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AI

1951

Pakistan

Afghanistan

AI

Jan. 2, 1948 ,

Pakistan

India

RI

Aug. 20, 1948

Pakistan

India

Ril ,3

Aug. 16, 1965

Pakistan (Kashmir)

India

RIIla

Oct. 27, 1947

Kashmir

India

Rlla,b

July. 17, 1948

India (Kashmir)

Pakistan

RI2a

Aug. 7, 1965

India (Kashmir)

Pakistan

AI2

Dec. 9, 1961

India

Portugal (Goa)

RI2a

Sept. 1958

India

China

A3

Sept. 1959

India (Sikkim)

China

RII2,fg

Nov. 1962

India

United States

RIIl

Feb. 1961

Nepal

India

RIIl

July 14, 1951

Nepal

India

RIIl

July, 1953

Nepal

India

AI

June 27, 1960

Nepal

China

AIII3

1959

Nepal

China

RI 2,3a

July 26, 1948

Hyderabad

India

RI2,3a

Sept. 13, 1948

Hyderabad

India

RI2a,b,g

Dec. 18, 1961

Portugal (Goa)

India

RI2,a,b,g

Dec. 18, 1961

Portugal (Diu)

India

RI2,a,b,g

Dec. 18, 1961

Portugal ( Damao)

India

AI2,3

Oct. 21 , 1959

China

India

RI2a,g

Apr. 11' 1962

China

India

AII2,3,f

Mar. 1950

China

U.S.S.R.

RI2

Aug. 27, 1950

China

United States

Ail,3,fg

June 1950

China

United States

AI2a,f

Apr. 1951

Chi.na

Taiwan
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RI2

Aug. 27, 1950

China

United Nations

RII3,f,g

June 1950

Taiwan

United States

RII2e

Jan. 1955

Taiwan

United States

RII2,3,f,g

Sept. 4, 1958

Taiwan

United States

RI2a ,f ,g

Jan. 10, 1955

Taiwan

China

RI2c\ g

June 25, 1950

South Korea

North Korea

RII2e,q

June 27, 1950

South Korea

United States

RII2

July 8, 1950

South Korea

United Nations

RI2,3,f,g

July 2, 1950

North Korea

United States

RI2a , f,g

Oct. 1 ' 1950

North Korea

South Korea

RI2

Oct. 7, 1950

North Korea

United Nations

RI 12 , g

Oct. 14, 1950

North Korea

China

RI2

Oct. 8, 1950

u.s.s.R.

United States

RI2

Oct. 8, 1950

U.S.S.R.

United Nations

Rll a , g

Mar. 1950

Tibet

China

A

Aug. 29, 1959

Bhutan

China

R2 ,3 , f, g

Mar. 19, 1964

Cambodia

United States

RIIId,g

1964

Cambodia

North Vietnam

RI2a

Aug. 11, 1962

RI2a

. Cambodia

Thailand

Apr. 1966

Cambodia

Thailand

AI2

Apr. 28, 1956

Cambodia

Sout.h Vietnam

RI2,3,f

June 1958

Cambodia

South Vietnam

RIIIe ,f,g

Oct. 25, 1962

Cambodia

South Vietnam

AI2,3

Oct. 1953

Thailand

Burma

RII2,3 ,f ,!1

May 17, 1962

Thailand

Unite€i States

RII2,3 ,f,q

May 24, 1962

Thailand

United Kinqdom

RII2,3 ,f,g

May 24, 1962

Thailand

Australia
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RII2,3,f,g

May 24, 1962

Thailand

New Zealand

AII le

1949

Thailand

Taiwan

AIII

1955

Laos

Taiwan

AI Ile

1949

Laos

Taiwan

Ala,f

Mar. 1958

Laos

North Vietnam

All, f

July 1959

Laos

North Vietnam

All, f

Dec. 29, 1960

Laos

North Vietnam

RIIl,f

Mar. 1961

Laos

United States

RIIl,3,f,g

May 1964

Laos

Unites States

AIII

June 27, 1964

Laos

South Vietnam

AI 1, f

Oct. 1961

Laos

U.S.S.R.

AIIl,3,f,g

Nov. 1965

Laos

Thailand

AI2

May 1964

South Vietnam

Cambodia

Ril a ,b, f ,g

Oct. 1960

South Vietnam

North Vietnam

RIIl,f,g

Dec. 11, 1961

South Vietnam

United States

RIIld,f ,g

Mar. 7, 1965

South Vietnam

United States

RIIl,f,g

South Vietnam

Australia

RIIl,f,g

June l ' 1967
July 15, 1965

South Vietnam

New Zealand

RIIl,f,g

July 23, 1966

South Vietnam

Thailand

RIIl,f,g

Aug. 15, 1966

South Vietnam

South Korea

RIIl,f,q

Sept. 11, 1966

South Vietnam

Phi 11 i pines

AI2a

Jan. 1959

North Vietnam

Laos

A2

Dec. 6, 1959

North Vietnam

Laos

RI2,f,g

July 30, 1964

North· Vietnam

South Vietnam

RI2,3,f,g

Feb. 8, 1965

North Vietnam

South Vietnam

RI2,3,f,q

Aug.4, 1964

North Vietnam

United States

11

RI I1 c

Dec. 8, 1962

Brunei

United Kingdom

Ril, f

Apr. 12, 1963

United Kingdom
(Sarawak)

Indonesia

RIIlc,g

Sept. 16, 1963

Malaya

United Kinqdom

RIIl,f,g

Aug. 31 , 1957

Malaya

United Kinc;dom

RIIl,f,g

Aug. 31 , 1957

Malaya

Commonwealth

Rlla,f,g

Dec. 29, 19b3

Malaya

Indonesia

RIIL, f

Nov. 1966

Malaya

Indonesia

RIIl

Sept. 1964

Malaya

Ne\'/ Zeal and

RIIl,g

Oct. 1964

Malaya

Austral~a

RIil

Aug. 18, 1965

Malaya

Singapore

AI

Dec. 1963

Indonesia

United Ki ngdorr1

AI

June 1965

Indonesia

United Kingdom

AI2

Mar. 15, 1964

Indonesia

Malaya

RII 1, f

Nov. 1966

Indonesia

Malaya

RIIl,f,g

Jan. 1952

United Kingdom
(Malaya)

Australia

1

;/

RIIl,f,g

Jan. 1952

United Kinadom
(Malaya)

New Zealand

RIIl,f,g

. Sept. 1955

United Kirigdom
(Malaya)

Commonwealth

AI2a,f

Jan 15, 1962

Netherlands (West
Irian-New Guinea)

Indonesia

RI Il

Oct. 25, 1951

Phillipines

United States

AI2a

July 1956

Burma

China

A3,f,g

1951

Burma

China

AII Il

1949

Burma

Taiwan

'·%I111,.
'!:7z:
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FOOTNOTES
1
sullivan, "International Consequences, 11 ~uilivan 1 s data are included
in Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of
Political and Social Iridicators ll_, (New Haven, Connecticut, and
Ann Arbor, Michigan:

Yale University and Inter-University Consortium

for Political Research, 1970).

Sullivan measured "armed attack events,"

but such events do not correspond to the definition of intervention
used in this study. Armed attack events were 11 military actions involving military activity within the borders of another country."
Sullivan points out that this was, at best, a rough estimate of intervention as he had defined it:
structure of the target.

attempts to affect the authority

Such"measurement increased the ambiguity

about what constitutes an intervention, and especially about the duration of interventions.

For 'instance, tn coding American intervention

in the Dominican Republic, Sullivan presented a multitude of armed
attack events.

Every time (or nearly so) American troops went to

downtown Santo Domingo and were shot at, Sullivan coded a new 11 intervention.11

As defined above, however, interventions continue as long

as troops remain, political purposes remain relevant to the intervention, and no step-level change in commitments is made.

•

It seems

reasonable to conclude that the Dominican Republic incident was a
single US intervention.

Sullivan included neither Vietnam nor Korea

in his data, probably because the "armed attack events" in these instances were so numerous as to defy codification.

It seems reasonable,

however, that both Vietnam and Korea were important post-War interventions (not simply by the US), and that they should be coded.

The year

1965 marked a step-level change in Vietnam, and a new US intervention
could be coded; however, there seems little need to code more than two

(continued)
1or three such new interventions either for Vietnam or Korea.

Much of

Sullivan's coding evidently came from the Index of the NewYork
- Times,
and on occ~sion was quite inaccurate. For instance, an intervention
was coded as the Index reported that US planes went into action in
Haiti; the story in the Times, however, indicated that these were
Haitian aircraft, built in the US but not piloted by US military
personnel .

•

2To obtain some idea of what might have been missed by starting from
an existing data set instead of completely re-collecting the data, the
New York Times Index was completely rechecked for the years 1948 and
1964, and all events which fit the intervention definition for all
countries in the study were recorded.

For 1948, the existing data

included all New York Times interventions except those concerning the
Palestine War.

For 1964, all Times-reported interventions except UK

into Uganda and UN into Cyprus appeared in the original data.

Thus,

on the basis of the two sampled years, the existing data set, while
not complete, offered a reasonable starting point for careful recoding
and augmentation.

An intra-coder reliability check was run on a com-

plex subset of the recoded and augmented data (dealing with the Ethiopia
-Somalia intervention) and it was found that agreement on all 52 substantive variables was 96%.
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